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A b s tra c t
This dissertation tests the extent to which International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) affect corporate transparency. This association is tested in 
the context of three factors relevant to transparency; The adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread, the cost of equity capital, and stock return 
volatility, with each addressed as a separate essay.
The first essay tests whether the global move toward IFRS, leads to a re­
duction in adverse selection for adopting firms, following adoption. A parsi­
monious model by Bollen et al. (2004), allows for decomposition of the spread 
into its respective components; order processing costs, inventory holding 
costs, and adverse selection costs. As the variable of interest, the Inventory 
Holding Premium (IHP) is examined surrounding IFRS adoption. Results 
reveal that the bid-ask spread itself actually increased following adoption 
across the entire sample, however the adverse selection component, modelled 
as the IHP, decreased. Restricting the sample to early adopters only and con­
trolling for potential self selection bias, early adopters enjoy a lower bid-ask 
spread over official adopters, but fail to show any change in adverse selection 
costs.
The second essay tests the contention that firms that switch to compliance 
with the IFRS from local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
experience a reduction in their cost of equity following the change. Drawing 
upon an ex ante cost of equity measure due to Pastor et al. (2008), and using 
Easton (2004) for robustness, models developed incorporate a post IFRS
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dummy variable, and control for other factors related to the cost of equity. 
Additionally, tests isolate early adopters and control for self-selection bias. 
Results provide only weak evidence that the IFRS succeed in reducing the 
cost of equity, with some mixed results across the specified models. Overall 
results suggest that in this context, it is possible that early adoption has 
merits, particularly for firms exhibiting greater visibility afforded by higher 
analyst following.
Finally essay three tests whether the switch to International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), results in a decrease in stock return volatility 
following adoption. An intuitive cross sectional volatility model is developed 
which identifies market volatility and ß as important factors. Further, given 
prior research, short-term and long-term effects are predicted to differ, hence 
separate tests identify the extent of the pre-post windows with this in mind. 
Results reveal that across the entire sample of adopters, the null of no de­
crease in stock volatility in the 10 months following adoption, is rejected. 
Short term tests are less convincing, with all but one specification failing 
to reject the null. This provides some evidence that the behaviour of stock 
volatility following this information event differs between the short and long
term.
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C hapter 1 
In troduction
1.1 A im s and Background
This dissertation examines transparency surrounding a widespread switch in 
financial reporting regime; the global move toward International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). In the absence of any direct measure of trans­
parency, this research will address the issue through three notions relevant to 
transparency; the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, the cost 
of equity, and stock return volatility. Further, the switch to the IFRS did not 
only happen uniformly on some mandatory adoption date, but also gradu­
ally prior to that point by firms wishing to early adopt. Delineating between 
these two groups of adopters, namely early and official provides interesting 
insight into whether the effect changes where a firm adopts in isolation or 
concurrent with many firms at a given point.
2005 marked a major event in financial reporting, with a number of coun­
tries simultaneously requiring financial report preparation pursuant to the
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IFRS for reporting periods following 1 January 2005. In 2001, the European 
Commission proposed that European Union (EU) firms commence reporting 
under the IFRS in 2005. Consistent with the EU, Australia has also progres­
sively harmonised their domestic standards with the IFRS, with mandatory 
adoption from 2005, with other countries making a commitment to adopt 
subsequent to this date. A major reason for harmonising with the IFRS is 
the ease by which financial comparisons may be draw, and the perceived 
transparency that results from their application. For example, the following 
is stated as justifying the EU experience (EC, 2001):
The Regulation would help eliminate barriers to cross-border 
trading in securities by ensuring that company accounts through­
out the EU are more transparent and can be more easily com­
pared. This would in turn increase market efficiency and reduce 
the cost of raising capital for firms.
The Australian government appears determined to pursue harmonisation 
prerogatives, however little empirical evidence exists testing their stated mo­
tivations. For instance, Policy Statement PS4 (ASCPA, 2005) suggests that 
one such benefit of harmonisation entails (ASCPA, 2005: 1436):
. . .  removing barriers to international capital flows by reducing 
differences in financial reporting requirements for participants in 
international capital markets and by increasing the understanding 
by foreign investors of Australian financial reports.
In an address to the Securities Institute and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Australia in 2002, John Howard affirms the following:
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I think you are also aware that the pursuit of a single set of 
high quality accounting standards has been an objective of the 
Government going back to the first CLERP initiative. And this 
recognises that uniform accounting standards, which are accepted 
in major international capital markets will greatly facilitate cross 
border comparisons by investors, reduce the cost of capital and 
assist Australian companies wanting to raise capital or list over­
seas.
Although the above arguments in support of harmonisation are echoed 
globally, only indirect, and inconclusive empirical evidence supports the rela­
tionship. Consequently, the empirical examination proposed here intends to 
add credence to the arguments or otherwise in light of the contemporaneous 
nature of the topic.
Despite the usage of transparency as justification, not only in relation 
to the EU case, but abroad, little research exists rejecting the null of no 
increase. Furthermore, a global switch toward a uniform accounting regime 
provides an interesting opportunity to investigate whether changing account 
standards has any effect on transparency. Consequently, the overarching 
research question addressed in this dissertation is:
Does a switch from domestic to international accounting stan­
dards affect corporate transparency?
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1.2 Structure
The first essay tests whether the global move toward the IFRS, leads to 
a reduction in adverse selection for adopting firms, following adoption. A 
parsimonious model by Bollen et al. (2004), allows for decomposition of the 
spread into its respective components; order processing costs, inventory hold­
ing costs, and adverse selection costs. As the variable of interest, the Inven­
tory Holding Premium (IHP) is examined surrounding IFRS adoption.
Using the Bollen et al. (2004) model as a foundation, a dummy variable 
is added which assumes a value of 1 in the post-IFRS period, and 0 other­
wise. Further, slope coefficients are included which interact the post-IFRS 
dummy variable, to test the post IFRS effect on these variables. Of par­
ticular interest here is the IHP slope dummy, which, as a measure of the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, captures any change due 
to IFRS adoption. Additionally, prior research suggests that firms which vol­
untarily disclose information, and indeed early adopt into the IFRS, exhibit 
predictable characteristics (e.g. Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001)). As such, early 
adopters are isolated, and the association tested in the presence of potential 
self-selection bias, with a Heckman (1979) two-step procedure.
Data for this essay span 20 countries, and includes 13,610 firm-month 
observations. Results indicate that across the full sample of adopters, the 
bid-ask spread actually increased following adoption, with the inclusion of 
a slope dummy term yielding a negative and significant coefficient; namely 
that the adverse selection component of the spread decreased post-adoption, 
relative to the pre adoption period. Further tests isolating early adopters
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from the full sample reveal that for this subset, the spread decreased, with 
no significant difference in adverse selection cost between the pre and post 
adoption period. The former effect, however, becomes insignificant upon 
including a year fixed effect.
The second essay tests the contention that firms that switch to compliance 
with the IFRS from local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
experience a reduction in their cost of equity following the change. This 
essay draws upon an ex ante cost of equity measure due to Pastor et al. 
(2008), which requires earnings per share (EPS) forecasts for years t + 1 and 
t + 2, and a long term growth forecast to infer t +  3. The measure goes 
further, inferring the expected EPS between t + 3 to t + 15, by setting the 
long run nominal GDP rate as the growth rate applicable at t + T  + 1, and 
imposing an exponential rate of decline from the growth rate in t + 3 to 
t + T  +1, in order to estimate growth rates, and hence expected EPS for the 
intervening years. Given the complex nature of the measure, the Modified 
Price-Earnings-Growth (PEG) model of Easton (2004) is used for robustness. 
As done in the first essay, a dummy variable is used to delineate the pre and 
post IFRS periods, and a Heckman (1979) two-step procedure is used to 
control for self-selection associated with early adoption.
Data for this essay span 17 countries, and includes 2,700 firm-month ob­
servations. While some evidence is revealed that the cost of equity is reduced 
by IFRS adoption alone, these results are not consistent across all specifi­
cations. However, the abnormal cost of equity, measured as the difference 
between the cost of equity of the sample firm, less the mean of a comparison
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group, is lower in the post IFRS period for early adopting firms with greater 
analyst following than before adoption. Interestingly, across both early and 
official adoptors, this same variable is positive and only weakly significant. 
Hence, it is possible that early adoption has its merits, particularly for firms 
exhibiting greater visibility afforded by higher analyst following.
Finally, essay three tests whether the switch to International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), results in a decrease in stock return volatility 
following adoption. An intuitive cross sectional volatility model is developed 
which identifies market volatility and ß as important factors. Further, given 
prior research, short-term and long-term effects are predicted to differ, hence 
separate tests identify the extent of the pre-post windows with this in mind.
Data for this essay span 22 countries, and includes 28,540 firm-month 
observations. Results reveal that across the entire sample of adopters, the 
null of no decrease in stock volatility in the 10 months following adoption, is 
rejected. Short term tests are less convincing, with all but one specification 
failing to reject the null. This provides some evidence that the behaviour 
of stock volatility following this information event differs, between the short 
and long term.
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C hapter 2
International A ccounting  
Standards, Transparency, and  
th e  C ost o f A dverse Selection
2.1 In troduction
This chapter tests whether the global move toward International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), leads to a reduction in adverse selection costs 
following adoption, and relative to non-adopters. A parsimonious model by 
Bollen et al. (2004), allows for decomposition of the spread into its respective 
components; order processing costs, inventory holding costs, and adverse 
selection costs. At the crux of the model is the Inventory Holding Premium 
(IHP), which is the premium required by market makers to compensate for 
the cost associated with holding inventory until the position is reversed out, 
and in this light, the risk of encountering an informed trader. The model is 
a refinement of the ad hoc specifications which preceded it (eg Harris (1994), 
Stoll (1978) and Tinic (1972)).
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With such a means of decomposing the bid-ask spread at hand, the effect 
of any actions expected to influence adverse selection may be examined. For 
example, Sidhu et al. (2008) examine the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(FD) of adverse selection costs, following its imposition in October 2000 
by the SEC. Importantly, they premise their hypothesis on the expected 
outcome of FD, and whether this affects the market maker’s probability of 
encountering an informed trader. They find that despite the SEC’s intention 
of addressing private information concerns, and that “...the regulation will 
improve information flow to the entire market and remove the opportunity 
for recipients to trade on the private information”, FD in fact increased 
adverse selection costs due to an information “chilling effect” from the analyst 
community, and a greater probability of a market marker encountering a 
trader possessing now, more valuable information.
Early research provides some evidence that disclosure policy is inversely 
related to a firm’s bid ask spread. Welker (1995) for example, provides US 
evidence to this effect, using a firm level disclosure rating data. Although 
he also predicts that this result be observed for firms expecting a high prob­
ability of an information event, the results thereof are insignificant. Much 
like the predictions of Welker (1995), the IFRS, as a global set of accounting 
rules, are widely cited as representing qualities promoting information trans­
parency. For as stated within the International Accounting Standards Com­
mittee Foundation’s (IASCF) constitution, the goal of the IASB is (IASCF, 
2005: 3):
. . .  to develop in the public interest, a single set of high quality, un-
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derstandable and enforceable accounting standards that require 
high quality, transparent and comparable information in finan­
cial statements and other financial reporting to help participants 
in the world’s capital markets and other users make economic 
decisions...
Empirical research also lends insight into the quality of IFRS relative to 
domestic standards. Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) enquire into the usefulness 
of IFRS related financial information versus various domestic standards in 
the context of analyst forecast accuracy, hypothesising that the process of 
harmonisation with the IFRS increases earnings predictability by reducing 
the number of accounting choices available globally. Secondly, greater dis­
closure is associated with a higher degree of analyst forecast accuracy (Lang 
and Lundholm, 1996). Assuming that the IFRS imply greater disclosure, 
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) suggest that this, coupled with the limitation 
of available measurement techniques; reduces forecast errors subsequent to 
adoption.
Bartov et al. (2005) find evidence that the IFRS produce more value rel­
evant information compared to German GAAP. They argue that domestic 
standards in Germany, being closely aligned to the information requirements 
surrounding taxation reporting, fail to consider the informational require­
ments of capital market actors. Irrespective of the standards used, actual 
cash flows represent unbiased economic results. Accrual accounting imposes 
adjustments to the cash flows dependent of the substance of the standards in 
use. In light of the worldwide differences in accounting regimes and support-
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ing institutions, the relevance thereof varies, and is not necessarily aligned 
to the needs of a global capital market.
Different sets of accounting standards (each devised as a function 
if their respective environments) as well as differences in enforce­
ment determine the limits on differences of reported earnings for 
the same economic results. Differences in objectives of reported 
financial information and opportunistic use of accruals by man­
agement could result in varying levels of value relevance of earn­
ings as reflected in the statistical association between earnings 
and stock returns (Bartov, Goldberg, and Kim, 2005: 98).
That being said, the empirical predictions of Welker (1995) provide a 
foundation for predicting the effect of the IFRS on adverse selection. The 
IFRS however, do provide a different angle to transparency than merely dis­
closure per se. As mentioned, one end of a single set of global standards 
on financial reporting is to promote comparability; the notion that earnings 
figures, for example, are calculated on a similar basis globally. Taking the 
basic argument of Welker (1995) that following an increase in disclosure, ad­
verse selection costs and hence the bid-ask spread are lower, provides the 
foundation. Indeed within an environment governed by relatively opaque 
accounting rules, there exists a greater likelihood of the market maker en­
countering a trader endowed with private information. One may view such 
an environment as exhibiting a low level of information diffusion, increasing 
the value of private information to informed traders. In this vein, the argu­
ment posited by Sidhu et al. (2008) in relation to the deleterious effect of
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FD on adverse selection costs provides relevance. The effect of FD according 
to Sidhu et al. (2008) was to curtail the dissemination of otherwise private 
information by firms to analysts and hence to the market, resulting in more 
valuable and longer lived private information.
The IFRS, arguably, have the opposite effect. The standards in many 
cases, would result in more information dissemination than would other­
wise be the case under domestic standards. This may produce an outcome 
of bringing to the public light otherwise private information, reducing the 
probability of encountering an informed trader, and hence the adverse selec­
tion cost of the bid-ask spread. Results indicate that across the full sample 
of adopters, the bid-ask spread actually increased following adoption, with 
the inclusion of a slope dummy term yielding a negative and significant coef­
ficient; namely that the adverse selection component of the spread decreased 
post-adoption, relative to the pre adoption period. Further tests isolating 
early adopters from the full sample reveal that for this subset, the spread de­
creased, with no significant difference in adverse selection cost between the 
pre and post adoption period.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 details the various com­
ponents of the bid ask spread; order processing costs, inventory holding cost, 
and adverse selection cost. Section 3 provides a brief derivation of the in­
ventory holding premium, the adverse selection measure used in this paper. 
Sections 4 and 5 specify the empirical model and data respectively. Section 
6 details the results, and section 7 concludes.
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2.2 D eterm inants o f th e bid-ask spread
The functional relationship between the bid-ask spread and its determinants 
remains an important field of enquiry within the discipline of finance. As a 
reflection of the cost of trading, and illiquidity of the market, the spread rep­
resents the difference between what active buyers and sellers pay and receive 
respectively (Stoll, 2004). In addition to the fixed cost component of con­
ducting a trade, involvement of a market maker brings to light additional risk 
factors, for which the market maker demands a higher return, consequently 
affecting the bid-ask spread. Therefore, the market maker will set the spread 
at a level reflective of the risk and costs associated with completing the trade, 
and ultimately closing out the position.
The costs incurred by the market maker fall into three categories; order­
processing costs, the inventory holding premium, and the cost of adverse 
selection (Stoll, 2004, 1978). Bollen et al. (2004) also suggest that the in­
volvement of multiple market makers induces price competition on setting 
the spread. Each of these components are discussed.
2.2 .1  O rder p rocessin g  costs
Order processing costs (OPC) are those directly related to facilitating and 
executing trade, and include floor space rent, the exchange seat, information 
technology, the opportunity cost of time, and labour Bollen et al. (2004). 
Such costs are largely fixed, implying that order processing costs, at the
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margin, decrease with trading volume. Following on from this, a number of 
empirical studies proxy order processing costs based trading volume or some 
variant (e.g. Branch and Freed (1977), who use trading volume, Tinic (1972), 
Tinic and West (1974, 1972), Stoll (1978) and Harris (1994), who use the log 
of trading volume, with Harris (1994) also measuring OPC as Given
that the contribution of OPC to the spread decreases with trading volume, 
a negative sign is predicted for this relationship, with the exception of the 
inverse measure, which is predicted to be positive.
2.2 .2  In ven tory-h old in g  cost
Market makers, in providing liquidity, bear risk due to price change volatility 
potentially affecting inventory value until the position is closed out. The mar­
ket maker hence prices this risk in the bid-ask spread. Naturally, the longer 
such stock is expected to be held in inventory, the higher the risk, and hence 
greater the cost. Proxies for inventory holding cost have previously fallen 
into one of two categories; those that proxy for the transaction or turnover 
rate (Demsetz, 1968), or those that attempt to capture the expected volatil­
ity during the holding period (for example Tinic (1972) who uses standard 
deviation of price, and Stoll (1978) and Harris (1994) who proxy inventory 
holding costs by historical return volatility.
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2.2 .3  A d verse  se lec tio n  cost
Market makers supply immediacy to the market, and are generally unaware 
of whether the investor with which he or she is transacting is better informed 
or not. The market maker will lose in the event that a trade takes place with a 
better informed investor (Stoll, 2004). The rationale behind this is as follows. 
The existence of private information before the trade, which is revealed after 
the trade takes place, adversely affects the value of inventory held by the 
market maker. To paraphrase, in trading with an informed investor, the 
market maker is, unknowingly buying (selling) for more (less) than the value 
of the stock.
Empirical proxies for the adverse selection cost are far from precise, but 
generally attempt to capture facets of a firm’s information environment. For 
example, Harris (1994) posit that larger firms, as measured by market cap­
italisation, have a greater level of information disseminated to the market, 
which in turn lowers the probability of adverse selection. Finally, Easley et al. 
(1996), following a similar line of argument, suggest that the higher the trad­
ing volume, the greater the involvement of informed traders, and hence the 
lower the adverse selection. As such, any means which reduce the level of 
information asymmetry, have the potential to reduce the bid-ask spread.
Although economic reasoning may provide a convincing argument sup­
porting the association between adverse selection and the bid-ask spread, 
G losten and Milgrom (1985) provide an intuitive analytical interpretation 
(Stoll, 2004). Take the case of an individual asset, which can only assume
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one of two values, either vH (a high value), or vL a low value. Either value 
has an equal probability of occurrence, and only informed investors know 
the true value. Also assume that the probability of the market maker en­
countering an informed investor is n. Since uninformed investors can only 
estimate the value of the asset given the expectation of equal probability of 
either outcome, and assuming risk neutrality, the expected value held by un­
informed investors is v = (vH 4- vL)/2. Given that the market maker is only 
aware of the equally likely outcomes vH and vL, and hence v, the ask price 
becomes the expected value v conditional on trade at the ask price. Given 
the probability of an informed trade, the market maker will demand any­
where between v and vH, when the probability is zero and one respectively, 
or expressed algebraically:
Conversely, the market maker is willing to buy at a bid price from the 
expected value v down to uL, or in other words, is willing to sell for the lowest 
value, given a high probability of an informed trade:
A =  v h tt - f  u ( l  — 7r) (2 .1)
B = VL 7T + v(l  — 7r) (2 .2)
Expressed in terms of the bid-ask spread:
A — B = 7t(vh — vL) ( 2 .3)
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Hence, the impact of the probability of an informed trade becomes clear. 
The market maker will set a higher ask, and a lower bid price, to compensate 
for the risk of encountering an informed trader. Given the position held in 
prior literature, firms operating in a rich information environment should 
present investors with a lower risk of adverse selection, and reduce the bid- 
ask spread as illustrated above.
2.3 Functional form: T he inventory holding  
prem ium
Given the factors suggested by Stoll (1978), the functional form of any model 
with the bid-ask spread on the left hand side, should utilise empirical proxies 
for order processing costs (OPC), the inventory holding premium (IHP), and 
adverse selection costs (ASC). Bollen et al. (2004) further suggest that the 
existence of multiple market makers induces price competition and hence 
downward pressure on the spread. Upon adding competition1, the functional 
form of such a model becomes:
SPRDi = f{OPCi , IHCi, ASC , , COMP)  (2.4)
Where SPRDi  is the bid-ask spread for firm z, OPCi,IHCi  and ASCi
are as defined above, for firm i, and COMP  is the competition proxy.
P ollen  et al. (2004) suggest that a Herfindahl index of concentration be used to proxy 
for competition. The measure is HI  =  ( t v )  where V3 is the volume traded by
market maker j ,  and TV  is the total volume traded by all market markers across the 
market.
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The market maker may be required to accommodate a customer buy or 
sell order, and consequently enter a long or short position in a given stock 
(Figures 2.1 and 2.2 respectively). The market maker hence assumes a risk 
that the market value of the position may change before it is ultimately 
reversed out (Figure 2.3 in the case where the market maker enters a short 
position). A potential means of hedging against such a movement, in the 
event that the dealer assumes a long position to accommodate an order, is 
to short an optimal number of futures contracts, ascertained as:
Min E[(AS + nFAF)2} (2.5)
A S  is the change in the stock price S, rip is the hedge ratio, and A F  is the 
change in the futures price F. The paucity of futures contracts necessary to 
meet the idiosyncratic nature of each dealer position, means that futures do 
not provide a practical hedging instrument. Given this, Bollen et al. (2004) 
state that the inventory holding premium is more generally stated as:
Min E[(AS + IHP \AS  < 0)2] (2.6)
Solving for the first-order condition, setting it equal to zero, and rear­
ranging to solve for the IHP:
I H P  = - E ( A S \ A S  < 0)Pr(AS  < 0) (2.7)
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Payoff
Figure 2.1 -  Payoff structure of going long a stock
Equation 2.7 suggests that the risk of an adverse movement is modeled 
as the lower semi variance. Hence, in order to compensate for this cost, at 
minimum, the IHP is the expected negative movement in the stock price, 
conditional on a decrease, multiplied by the probability of a negative move­
ment. Bollen et al. (2004) state that in the case of the market maker buying 
at the bid, a means of managing this risk is to buy an at-the-money put 
option, or conversely an at-the-money call option (Figure 2.4), in the case 
of selling at the ask (Figure 2.5). Although similar to the case with futures 
contracts, options don’t necessarily provide a viable hedging instrument in 
a practical sense, they do however provide a parsimonious means of pricing 
the inventory holding premium and adverse selection cost.
Premised on the Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) option
18
Payoff
Figure 2.2 -  Payoff structure of going short a stock
Payoff
Figure 2.3 -  Market maker’s exposure when they execute a trade at the ask price
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Payoff
Figure 2.4 -  Call option payoff structure
Payoff
Figure 2.5 -  Market maker’s hedge position when executing a trade at the ask price, 
and holding a call option until the time of an offsetting trade
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pricing models, Bollen et al. (2004), in the case where the market maker 
takes a short position and hence requires a call option as a theoretical hedging 
instrument, put forth the following expression:
I HP  =  S N  +  0'5<tv^ )  -  X N  ( ^ 7 p  _  (2 -8)
Recalling that the appropriate instrument is an at-the-money call option 
with t time to expiration, Equation 2.8 reduces to:
I H P  =  S[2./V(0.5ct\/Ö -  1] (2.9)
and given that the time frame over which the position is open t is stochastic, 
the expression for the IHP becomes:
I H P  = S[2JV(0.5 oE-  1] (2.10)
The IHP expression in Equation 2.10 requires only three variables for 
calculation; the stock price at the time that the position is opened, the 
historical volatility of the stock, and the time between offsetting trades t. 
In order to gauge t, data is required which provide a historical idea of the 
typical length of time before an offsetting trade enables the position to be 
closed. As will be established later in the paper, daily trade volume will 
used to estimate the average number of minutes between trades on a given
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day. Intraday data however, if available, may be used to make a more direct 
estimate.
2.4 E m p irica l m odel
The purpose of this study is to ascertain whether the adoption of IFRS have 
resulted in a decrease in adverse selection, hence, this section develops the 
models necessary to test this effect. In so doing, the approach taken by Sidhu 
et al. (2008) is adopted here, using the firm specific IFRS adoption date as 
the point of interest.
Recall the various components of the bid-ask spread discussed in Section 
2.2; order processing costs, inventory holding costs, and adverse selection 
costs. In developing the required model, the model of Bollen et al. (2004) is 
firstly used as a starting point, which states that the spread is a function of 
the aforementioned three components in the following form:
SPRDi = a0 + ailnvTVi + (X2IH Pi + a^M HR + 6i (2-11)
Where:
SP R D it =  the bid-ask spread for firm i at time t 
InvTVit = the inverse of trading volume for firm i at time £; and 
IH Pü — the inverse of trading volume for firm i at time £, ascertained 
by Equation 2.10.
MHIi  =  the modified Herfindahl index as per Bollen et al. (2004)2 
Next, to test whether switching to the IFRS affected the spread itself, 
a dummy variable assuming a value of 0 in the pre adoption period, and 1 
post IFRS adoption, is added to the specification. Furthermore, to isolate 
an effect on adverse selection following adoption, slope dummy terms, com­
prising InvT V  and I H P  each interacted with the pre-post dummy D, are 
also added. The empirical model tested in this paper hence becomes:
S P R D it = Cko -r a.\InvTVi +  HPi ~r -r ct4 ln v T V lDt (2.12) 
+ 0 :5 / H P{Dt +  Ci
Where:
SP R D u= 
InvTVit =  
I P  P it  =
P it  —
the bid-ask spread for firm i at time t
the inverse of trading volume for firm i at time t
the inverse of trading volume for firm i at time t, ascertained
by Equation 2.10; and
a dummy variable assuming a value of 0 in the pre, and 1 in 
the post adoption period, for firm i at time t.
2 Although Bollen et al. (2004) include M H I  to account for competition among market 
makers, this variable is dropped in the analyses that follow. This variable is likely to be 
insignificant in competitive markets, which is assumed to be the case here
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According to Bollen et al. (2004) a positive sign is predicted for oq. Order 
processing costs are largely fixed, hence the order processing costs per market 
maker decrease as trading volume increases. As per Bollen et al. (2004), as 
the inverse of trading volume increases, implying that as the proxy for order 
processing costs approaches zero, the spread decreases. Secondly, as has been 
established, inventory holding and adverse selection costs have a positive 
relation with the spread. Therefore, the coefficient on the proxy for these 
components, the IHP, is predicted to have a positive sign. Of particular 
interest upon estimating Equation 2.12 are coefficients <a3 and <a5, which 
indicate the post-adoption effect on the bid-ask spread, and importantly the 
interaction term IHP^Dt, a slope dummy term, which indicates the effect on 
the adverse selection component of the spread, respectively.
Several variants of Equation 2.12 are tested to account for the effects of 
country and time. Firstly, two country level variables are added to Equation 
2.12 which are likely to affect the probability of the market maker encoun­
tering an informed trader. Firstly, a disclosure index score by CIFAR (1995) 
to control for the pre-adoption information environment by country. As dis­
cussed, the lower the required disclosure in a given country, the lower the 
level of desseminated public information. Secondly, a country level corrup­
tion index score, as adopted by La Porta et al. (2006), is included. The 
higher the rated prevalence of corruption in a given country, the higher the 
probability that one may encounter an informed trader, due to the greater 
incidence of insider trading. Incorporation of the above into 2.12 results in 
the following specification:
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SPRD Ü = ao + ailnvTVi + ct2lHPi + a^Dt + a^InvTViDt (2.13) 
+abIHPiDt + a 6D ISC LO SEt + a 7CORRUPT\ +  Ci
Where:
SP R D lt = 
InvTVit = 
IH Pa =
Du —
D ISC LO SE  = 
C O R R U P T =
the bid-ask spread for firm i at time t
the inverse of trading volume for firm i at time t
the inverse of trading volume for firm i at time t, ascertained
by Equation 2.10
a dummy variable assuming a value of 0 in the pre, and 1 in 
the post adoption period, for firm i at time t 
a disclosure index score obtained from CIFAR (1995); and 
a corruption index score, as per La Porta et al. (1998).
Finally, three fixed effects models (country, year, and both country and 
year), are tested.
The above specifications denoted by Equations 2.12 and 2.13 imply in­
clusion of all adopters, irrespective of whether a firm is an early adopter, or 
adopted the standards in line with an official, country wide, adoption date. 
Being an exercise in voluntary disclosure, firms which early adopt into the 
IFRS, may be assumed to do so based on similar grounds and motivations 
as firms who voluntarily disclose generally. That being said, there may be 
characteristics of early adopters, which prompt such firms to self select into 
early adoption of the IFRS regime. Such a self selection problem creates an
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omitted variable problem, which may arise due to private information as­
sociated with self selection (Li and Prabhala, 2007). The following section 
presents the method used herein to account for this issue.
2.4.1 S elf S election  B ias
Originating with Heckman (1979), the notion of self-selection may be viewed 
as giving rise to an omitted variable problem. Li and Prabhala (2007) illus­
trate this as follows. Assume that the following regression requires estima­
tion:
Y{ = Xiß  + €{ (2-14)
Assume now, that a sub-sample of firms self selects into choice E. For this 
sub-sample of firms, the applicable regression equation becomes:
Yi\E = Xiß +  ei\E (2.15)
As the self-selected sub sample is not random, failure to account for self­
selection results in inconsistent ß estimators. In correcting for self selection 
bias, the first step requires identification of factors likely to explain the de­
cision to self-select. I.e:
E = Wi = Zi'y + rji > 0 (2.16)
Where Wi is the selection variable, typically a dichotomous variable de­
noted as 1 for selection, and 0 otherwise. Zi is a vector of public exogenous
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variables, 7 is a vector of coefficients, and 77* is an error term orthogonal to 
7. It therefore implies that the equivalent expression for non-selection, N E , 
is as follows:
NE =  Wi =  Za  + r] i< 0  (2.17)
Therefore, to estimate Equation 2.14 in the presence of self selection, and 
taking its expectation, and substituting in 2.16, the expression becomes:
Yi\E — X iß  +  (eilZi'y +  r/i >  0)
=  Xiß +  7r(ei\Za +  rji > 0) +  (2.18)
The expression in 2.18 follows from the notion that eßrii = 7rrji + Vi, 
a regression of on 77^, where tt is therefore the coefficient, and Vi is the 
orthogonal error term. An equivalent expression for firms which do not self 
select into the choice under investigation may similarly be derived, by substi­
tuting Equation 2.17 into Equation 2.14. Taking expectations, and denoting 
the second term in Equation 2.18 as Ac(Zt7), Li and Prabhala (2007) present 
the following expression, which captures the essence of Heckman (1979):
E(Yi\C) =  X iß +  nXc (Za)  (2.19)
Where n is the coefficient on the inverse mills ratio, and C denotes the 
choice to self select, or otherwise, by the firm. Examination of 2.19 clearly 
reveals the omitted variable problem. Estimation of 2.14 omits the final
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term in Equation 2.19, which arises due to a subset of firms self selecting 
into a given choice. Voluntary adoption into a particular disclosure regime, 
or in this case, early adoption, provides a classic example of the self selection 
problem. Therefore, a 2-step Heckman estimation to account for potential 
self selection bias requires, in addition to a vector of explanatory variables 
Xi, but also a vector Z* of public variables which, according to theory, are 
expected to predict the self selection decision. The following section elab­
orates the choice of Z* as applicable to this chapter; firm specific variables 
associated with early IFRS adoption.
Early adoption: P rob it m od el to  account for self-selection
Much of the literature in accounting suggests systematic characteristics of 
firms which essentially opt in, or voluntarily provide financial disclosure above 
a minimum requirement. For example, Healy et al. (1999) finds that firms 
that intend on raising external capital within the United States provide ad­
ditional voluntary disclosure prior to the issuance. Further, firms which have 
higher visibility are more inclined to provide voluntary disclosure. For ex­
ample, large firms tend to be more transparent (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1993), as do firms which are cross-listed (Lang et al. 
2003).
International evidence tends to reveal similar results at the global level, 
albeit with external dependence emerging as a consistently important fac­
tor. Ashbaugh (2001) for instance, finds that the choice to voluntarily report 
under either the international accounting standards (IAS) or United States
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(US) Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), by non-US firms 
is associated with the number of foreign listings, the existence of a forthcom­
ing stock issuance, and the transparency afforded by the extant domestic 
standards. Furthermore, Dumontier and Raffournier (1998), El-Gazzar et 
al. (1999), Murphy (1999), and Cuijpers and Buijink (2005), all find that 
the dispersion of foreign operations is highly associated with the decision to 
adopt non-local GAAP, in accord with the notion that such firms exhibit 
heterogeneity in their stakeholder base.
Prior empirical literature specifically examining the decision to voluntar­
ily opt into the IFRS regime, follows the above. Hung and Subramanyam 
(2007), in examining the shift of German firms to the IFRS, control for po­
tential self-selection bias by running a probit regression of the decision to 
voluntarily adopt, on return on assets, leverage, size, cross listing, increase 
in common stock, increase in long term debt, and industry and year dum­
mies. Consistent with the prior studies, the size coefficient is positive and 
highly significant. Based on the visibility and foreign dependence arguments, 
the following first-stage regression is specified:
Q  = ßo + ßi L N SIZ E u  + foEPSit + foFSALESu  (2.20)
+ß4L IS T IN G S ü +  ßbN U M E STlt +  ß6DISCLOSEi 
+ß7CORRUPTi +  eit
Where:
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LN SIZ E n  = 
E P S ü = 
FSALESu =
A dichotomous variable assuming a value of 1 if the firm is a 
voluntary adopter, or 0 otherwise.
The natural log of size for i at time t 
Earnings per share for firm i at time t
Foreign sales as a proportion of total sales for firm i at time
t
L IS T IN G S it = 
NUMESTn = 
DISCLOSEi = 
C O R R U P T =
The number of foreign listings for firm i at time t 
The number of analysts following firm i at time t 
Local GAAP based disclosure/transparency score for firm i 
a corruption index score, as per La Porta et al. (1998).
Time t denotes the time of the switch to the IFRS, or more specifically, 
the most recent data prior to adoption.
2.5 D ata
As a starting point, accounting standard regime adoption data, as reporting 
in the notes to the annual financial statements were obtained from World- 
scope. The initial sample consisted of all firms covered by Worldscope, for 
which an identifiable shift from domestic standards to the IFRS during the 
period 1998-2008, is observed. Although adoption prior to this period was 
indeed possible, Epstein and Mirza (2004) note that the period surround­
ing and following the push toward IOSCO endorsement, and the improved 
additions to the standards standards rolled out in 1998 to meet IOSCO re­
quirements, provides a landmark move toward quality and acceptance of the
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Standards. After removing observations for which no firms are reported to be 
IFRS firms in a given country, the remaining sample on standards adoption 
is 18,761 firms. The year of the switch is identified as the first instance of 
IFRS reporting noted by Worldscope, provided the year prior is specified as 
reporting under domestic standards. Unavailability of data regarding IFRS 
adoption in a given year preceded by domestic standards in the year before 
was deemed insufficient data to conclude an initial switch, hence such firms 
are excluded from the sample of adopters. The final sample of adopters is 
5856 firms, 571 of which being early adopters 3.
Next, data is obtained for each of the variables necessary for the afore­
mentioned regression specifications in general, and the inventory holding pre­
mium in particular. Daily bid, ask, return, trading volume, and stock price 
data are obtained from Thompson Datastream. The expected volatility rate 
er, is measured as return volatility over the prior 60 trading days, annualised. 
The square root of the time between trades y/t is inferred from daily trading 
volume. Assuming trades are in round lots of 100 shares, and the existence 
of 390 trading minutes in a given day, as 390/trades, which gives the trading 
frequency in minutes. To maintain consistency with annualised volatility, the 
time between trades is also annualised.
Data is required for the 5 months prior to the adoption month (pre-IFRS 
observations), and the 5 months after adoption (post-IFRS observations). 
Based on this requirement, the initial sample is 58,560 firm-month obser-
3 A number of sources were consulted in order to ascertain official adoption information 
by country, however http://www.iasplus.com (Deloitte), provided a vast majority of this 
data.
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vations. Any firm which has insufficient data in order to form exactly 5 
pre-IFRS and 5 post-IFRS observations as stated above, is removed from the 
sample. This restriction effectively reduced the sample to 1361 unique IFRS 
adopters, and hence 13610 firm-month observations; being 6805 pre-IFRS 
and 6805 post-IFRS.
In order to estimate the models necessitating the DISCLOSURE and 
CORRUPT variables, CIFAR (1995) and La Porta et al. (1998) respectively, 
provide these measures. To estimate the probit specification required for self­
selection correction, data on market capitalisation, earnings per share, foreign 
sales, and the number of foreign listings, were collected from Worldscope, and 
number of analysts was obtained from I/B /E /S.
2.6 R esu lts
The effect of IFRS adoption on the cost of adverse selection is analysed as 
follows. The data is firstly stratified between the pre and post IFRS adop­
tion data points, with descriptive statistics on the IHP and its components 
reported. Secondly, a linear model is estimated, regressing the bid ask spread 
on each of its components, as well as these components interacted with the 
event dummy variable. This model enables isolation of the pre and post effect 
components on the spread itself. Finally, a self selection model is estimated, 
to establish whether the effect is observable against a matched sample of non 
adopters, and official adopters, respectively.
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2.6.1 D escrip tive  S ta tistics
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics by country, for the spread, the IHP, 
and components thereof. As expected, there appears to be some level of 
variation across markets. For example, Switzerland and Denmark report 
spreads of 0.5153 and 0.4856 respectively, and at the lower end, New Zealand, 
Australia and China, with 0.0169, 0.0353 and 0.0376 respectively. These 
figures are, of course, relative to average stock price, with the aforementioned 
countries also reporting the highest and lowers average stock prices across 
countries. Trading volume is on average, 1.15 million in New Zealand and 
Austria at the lowest, with a mean of 13,657.
At 0.6884, China reports the highest stock volatility across all reported 
countries. Most countries however, fall between 0.3 and 0.4. Notable ex­
ceptions include Germany and Austria, at 0.5151 and 0.5561 respectively, 
and Great Britain, which exhibits a volatility of 0.5335. Finally, countries 
which show the lowest mean stock volatility include Spain (0.2283), Portu­
gal (0.2409), and Italy (0.2596). Finally, the IHP ranges in magnitude from 
0.0007 and 0.0027 for New Zealand and Australia respectively, to 0.0747 and 
0.0341 for Austria and China respectively. Apart from these extremes, all 
remaining countries fall within reasonable limits, consistent with Bollen et al. 
(2004).
Changing focus from country level mean values to a comparison of pre- 
IFRS and post-IFRS statistics (Table 2.2) reveals that that bid-ask spread 
actually marginally increased following a switch to the IFRS. This however, 
appears to be in line with the increase in stock price, which is reported in the
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post-IFRS period. Stock volatility, decreased from 0.4035 in the pre-IFRS 
period, to 0.3751 in the post-IFRS period. Finally, although the IHP appears 
to have increased from 0.0094 to 0.0099 in the post-IFRS period, it would be 
reasonable to view this as being economically insignificant.
Table 2.3 provides a summary of cross correlations, presented by time 
period relative to IFRS adoption. As expected, I N V T V , the inverse of trade 
volume, is highly correlated with TT, which is the average time between 
trades in minutes. Further, IH P  is negatively correlated with trade volume 
TV, and positively correlated with TT.  This makes sense, as the latter 
two factors are cited as being related to adverse selection, and bear this 
association in both /citetBSW04 and /citetSSWW08.
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2.6 .2  R egression  R esu lts
Table 2.4 reports the results of estimation of Equations 2.12 and 2.13. T- 
statistics are in parentheses below the parameter estimates, and are based 
on clustered standard errors, clustered on country and firm. Model (1) is 
the Equation 2.13 specification, and specifications (2)-(4) are fixed effects 
models, with fixed effects on country (2), year (3) and both country and year 
(4). The coefficient on I H P  is positive and significant (7.23, t=12.20) as 
predicted by Bollen et al. (2004), however, the the proxy for order processing 
costs, I N V T V  is insignificant and negative. This result is consistent across 
all specifications. Examination of the result on D, which is the pre-post 
dummy variable, reveals a positive and significant coefficient estimate, indi­
cating that the spread, in fact increased following adoption (0.0033, t=2.21), 
and is also consistent across all specifications, except (4), where it becomes 
insignihcant. Indeed, such a result goes contrary to seminal research exam­
ining the association between disclosure and the bid-ask spread (e.g. Welker 
(1995)). Recall however, that mean stock price actually increased following 
the adoption date, hence the reported parameter estimate may simply be 
capturing this effect, and not bear any relationship to adverse selection.
The slope dummy term IN V  * D isolates the effect of adverse selection 
in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre adoption period. It is therefore 
predicted that the coefficient on this term be negative, in the event that 
the adverse selection component of the spread decreases, following adoption. 
Table 2.4 specification (1) reports a coefficient of -0.5565 (t=-2.61), implying 
that a 1% increase in adverse selection results in a decrease in the bid-ask
40
Table 2.3 -  Summary of cross-correlations: pre vs post IFRS
S  is th e  stock price, m easured  as th e  m idpoint betw een th e  bid and  ask, T V  is th e  average num ber of 
shares trad e d  over a  m onth , I N V T V  is th e  inverse of T V ,  A N N V O L  is stock volatility, calcu la ted  as 
th e  s tan d ard  dev ia tion  of stock re tu rn s in th e  60 trad in g  days prior to  th e  curren t m onth, T T  is th e  tim e 
betw een trad e  in m inutes, and I  H P  is th e  inventory holding prem ium
V ariable S TV INV TV ANNVOL T T IH P
Pre-IF R S  (n =6805)
S 1 -0.0467 0.0685 -0.271 -0.0154 0.5755
T V -0.0467 1 -0.3159 -0.0368 -0.4903 -0.2863
IN V TV 0.0685 -0.3159 1 0.0554 0.8075 0.5036
ANNVOL -0.271 -0.0368 0.0554 1 0.1107 0.0398
T T -0.0154 -0.4903 0.8075 0.1107 1 0.4813
IH P 0.5755 -0.2863 0.5036 0.0398 0.4813 1
Post-IF R S  (n=6805)
S 1 -0.0576 0.0523 -0.3006 -0.0098 0.6043
T V -0.0576 1 -0.3412 0.0284 -0.5078 -0.2845
IN V TV 0.0523 -0.3412 1 0.0338 0.8382 0.4671
ANNVOL -0.3006 0.0284 0.0338 1 0.0917 -0.0143
T T -0.0098 -0.5078 0.8382 0.0917 1 0.4827
IH P 0.6043 -0.2845 0.4671 -0.0143 0.4827 1
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Table 2.4 -  Results: Adoption pre-post regression
Results of estim ating the following regression model:
S P R D u  =  cco +  ot\InvTVi -)- a 2 l  HPi  +  a$Dt  +  a^InvTViDt
-\-Q5I H PiDt  +  ctfjDI SC  LOS Ei +  a7COR.RU PTi +  ej
S P R D  is the bid-ask spread, T V  is the average number of shares traded over a month, IN V T V  is the 
inverse of TV, D  is a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 in the post-IFRS period, and 0 otherwise, 
and IHP is the inventory holding premium, calculated by:
I H P  =  S[2N(0.5aVt)  -  1]
D IS C L O S U R E  is a country level disclosure score as per CIFAR (1995), and C O R R U P T  is a corruption 
index score as used by La Porta et al. (1998). T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estim ates in 
parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
INTERCEPT 0.0906 0.4055 0.0176 0.2912
(2.25) (68.06) (1.74) (14.75)
INVTV -43.308 -22.425 -31.864 -18.021
(-1.81) (-1.88) (-1.38) (-1.80)
IHP 7.2394 6.6948 7.4582 6.5084
(12.20) (19.86) (8.10) (15.45)
D 0.0033 0.0033 0.0038 0.0026
(2.21) (2.41) (2.16) (1.77)
INVTV*D 4.4926 1.8500 9.6843 4.8428
(0.71) (0.35) (1.40) (0.81)
IHP*D -0.5565 -0.5383 -0.4856 -0.4480
DISCLOSURE
CORRUPT
(-2.61)
-0.0038
(-2.80)
0.0247
(3.15)
(-2.55) (-2.15) (-2.11)
Observations 13510 13610 13610 13610
R? 0.6830 0.7386 0.6787 0.7525
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spread of 0.5565% in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS period. 
Therefore, although the spread is shown to have increased in the post-IFRS 
period, isolation of its adverse selection component shows that its adverse 
selection component decreased, as predicted. The same result persists across 
the various fixed effects models (2)-(4).
The negative coefficient on the DISCLOSURE  variable in specification 
(1) is in accord with prior research on the relation between disclosure and the 
bid ask spread (Welker, 1995). Hence, a higher pre-IFRS country level disclo­
sure score is associated with a lower bid-ask spread. Finally, the CORRUPT  
coefficient is positive (0.0247), and significant (t=3.15).
Table 2.5 reports the results of estimation upon inclusion of only early 
adopters, hence the smaller sample size (n=710). Specifications (l)-(4), are 
identical to what is presented in Table 2.4, albeit including early adopters 
only. Interestingly, Table 2.5 (l)-(4) paints a slightly different picture than 
the full sample regressions. The Bollen et al. (2004) base results are un­
changed; positive and significant coefficients on I H P  across all four speci­
fications, and insignificant on I N V T V . Early adopters however, exhibit a 
statistically significant reduction in their bid-ask spread following adoption 
(-0.0234, t=-2.14 and -0.0225, t=-2.10; for specifications (1) and (2) respec­
tively). Specifications (3) and (4), the year and country/year fixed effects 
models, yield insignificant results. The adverse selection component of the 
spread following adoption, I H P  * D, is insignificant for early adopters, and 
while the coefficient on DISCLOSURE  is negative and significant, as in 
Table 2.4, the coefficient on CORRUPT  is insignificant.
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Table 2.5 -  Results: Early adopters relative to matched official adopters 
R esults of estim ating  th e  following regression model:
S P R D a  — ao  +  a i ln v T V i  +  02 IH P i  +  a^D t + a ^ In vT V iD t
+ a bI H P lD t +  oc§DISCLOSEi  +  orjCORRU PT\ £j
S P R D  is th e  bid-ask spread, T V  is th e  average num ber of shares trad ed  over a  m onth, I N V T V  is the  
inverse of T V ,  D is a dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 1 in th e  post-IFR S period, and 0 otherw ise, 
and IH P is th e  inventory holding prem ium , calculated by:
I H P  = S[2N( 0.5aVi )  -  1]
D IS C L O S U R E  is a  country  level disclosure score as per CIFA R (1995), and C O R R U P T  is a  corruption  
index score as used by L a P o rta  e t al. (1998). T -sta tistic s are reported  below th e  coefficient estim ates in 
parentheses, and are corrected for het.eroscedasticity and au tocorrela tion  in th e  residuals.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IN T E R C E P T
INV TV
IHP
D
INVTV*D
IHP*D
DISCLO SURE
C O R R U PT
LAMBDA
Observations
R?
0.3998 0.1039
(1.76) (8.43)
-43.163 -43.268
(-1.49) (-1.81)
5.1725 5.3154
(6.59) (8.31)
-0.0234 -0.0225
(-2.14) (-2.10)
-12.821 -8.5654
(-0.29) (-0.20)
0.9185 0.8013
(1.03) (0.89)
-0.0061
(-2.15)
0.0124
(0.29)
710 710
0.5123 0.5242
0.0450 0.0585
(1.79) (1.81)
13.3012 -8.1389
(0.39) (-0.45)
4.7065 4.1686
(8.17) (7.19)
0.0220 0.0037
(0.89) (0.15)
-30.012 -21.401
(-1.13) (-1.14)
-0.5835 0.1401
(-1.10) (0.36)
710 710
0.6566 0.6793
0.3565 0.1598
(1.38) (12.24)
-52.458 -52.816
(-1.66) (-2.01)
5.0296 5.1732
(5.54) (6.61)
-0.0240 -0.0231
(-2.14) (-2.06)
-13.883 -9.5759
(-0.31) (-0.22)
0.9691 0.8508
(1.19) (1.06)
-0.0077
(-2.70)
0.0354
(0.76)
-0.0640 -0.0653
(-3.85) (-3.69)
710 710
0.5200 0.5322
0.0395 0.0658
(1.00) (1.23)
13.8318 -9.3764
(0.44) (-0.70)
4.7212 4.1547
(7.91) (6.60)
0.0221 0.0036
(0.88) (0.14)
-29.836 -21.632
(-1.10) (-1.10)
-0.5858 0.1478
(-1.11) (0.34)
0.0058 -0.0084
(0.19) (-0.26)
710 710
0.6567 0.6794
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The final series of models controls for self-selection bias, a possibility as­
sociated with early adopters opting into the IFRS prior to an official require­
ment to do so at the country level. Estimation of this model is pursuant to a 
Heckman two-step approach, with the first step being a probit estimation of a 
dummy variable (early/official adoption) on characteristics of early adopters 
(Equation 2.20). Table 2.6 reports the result of the probit estimation. Con­
trary to prior voluntary disclosure literature, the coefficient on L N S I Z E  is 
significantly negative (-0.2257, t=-7.27), indicating that larger firms are less 
inclined to early adopt than smaller firms. This may stem from the notion 
that smaller firms may wish to increase their visibility through opting into, 
voluntarily, a higher quality financial reporting regime. For example, Healy 
et al. (1999) find that firms who increase their level of public disclosure ex­
perience an increase in analyst following and institutional ownership, which 
may be sufficient motivation to opt into the IFRS early.
The coefficient estimate on E P S  is positive and significant, indicative of 
higher performing firms being more willing to early adopt than poorer per­
formers, most likely in order to be distinguishable from the latter, by the 
market. A N A L Y S T S  is marginally significant (i.e. at the 10% level) and 
negative, providing additional support to the L N S I Z E  justification; firms 
with higher analyst following have a richer information environment, and 
hence see little benefit in early IFRS adoption. Finally, the coefficients on 
DISCLOSURE  (-0.0285, t=-3.34) and CORRUPT  (0.4911, t=10.39) sug­
gest that firms within countries with a documented higher level of information 
disclosure pre-IFRS, are less likely to early adopt, and those within countries
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Table 2.6 -  Results: Probit model of determinants of early adoption
R esults of estim ating  th e  following prob it model:
Ci = ß0 + ß i L N S I Z E u  + ß 2E P S it + ß3 F S  A L E  Sit + ß \ L I S T I N G S «
+ß 5N U M E S T it + ß eD IS C L O S E i  + ß jC O R R U P T i  +  eit
C  is a dichotom ous variable assum ing a  value of 1 if th e  firm is an  early adopter, and 0 if the  firm 
adopts a t th e  official country  level adoption  da te , L N S I Z E  is th e  log of m arket cap italisation , E P S  is 
earnings per share scaled by price, F S A L E S  is th e  level of foreign sales as a  percentage of to ta l sales, 
A N  A L Y  S T S  is th e  num ber of analysts following the  firm, L I  S T  I N G S  is th e  num ber of foreign exchange 
listings, D IS C L O S U R E  is a country  level disclosure score as per C IFA R  (1995), and C O R R U P T  is a  
corrup tion  index score as used by La P o rta  e t al. (1998). T -sta tis tic s  are reported  below th e  coefficient 
estim ates in parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and au tocorrela tion  in th e  residuals.
Variable
IN T E R C E P T 2.3233
(3.51)
LNSIZE -0.2160
(-7.14)
EPS 0.1908
(3.69)
FSALES 0.0073
(0.92)
LISTINGS 0.0255
(0.21)
ANALYSTS -0.0348
(-1.93)
DISCLO SURE 0.0016
(0.12)
O bservations 1420
R-Square 0.1019
M ax-rescaled 0.1359
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with higher perceived corruption are more likely to early adopt. In brief, 
the probit results provide evidence that firms within a lower information en­
vironment, have higher performance, and operate within a country with a 
higher perception of corruption, adopt IFRS early as a signaling mechanism 
to distinguish themselves from other firms.
Table 2.5 (5)-(8) is once again identical to the prior specifications, but 
with the addition of LAMBDA,  to control for self-selection. Like Table 2.5 
(l)-(4), specifications (5) and (6) report significant and negative coefficients 
on D (-0.0239, t=-2.12 and -0.0229, t=-2.03 respectively), which are again 
insignificant for the year and country/year fixed effects models. For (5) and 
(6), LAM BD A  is significantly negative, revealing self-selection bias, and 
suggesting that the private information associated with early adoption is 
in fact associated with a reduction in the bid-ask spread. Upon including 
fixed effects for year and year/country however, the previously negative and 
significant result on D becomes insignificant, as does LAM  B D A , indicating 
that the time of adoption likely explains the reduction in the spread and self 
selection bias previously documented.
2.7 C onclu sion
The world is currently undergoing quite possibly one of the most significant 
financial information shifts in history. As the new global standard in financial 
reporting, the IFRS, many argue, are high quality accounting standards ca­
pable of promoting transparency and comparability beyond that achievable
47
by prior domestic standards. Indeed empirical evidence which compares the 
IFRS to various domestic standards provides strong support for the above 
contentions.
Following widespread adoption following 2005, and the potential for early 
adoption prior to that, testing the effect of the IFRS on promoting trans­
parency, and the benefits thereof; is apt at this juncture. This paper ad­
dresses one such aspect; adverse selection costs, as operationalised by the in­
ventory holding premium (Bollen et ah, 2004). Much prior research assumes 
that adverse selection is subsumed in the bid-ask spread, with prior ad hoc 
specifications used to test various predictors on the spread. Bollen et al. 
(2004) demonstrate that such approaches provide an imprecise yardstick in 
ascertaining any effect on adverse selection cost, and provide a parsimonious 
model which is theoretically well justified, and based on an intuitive market 
maker hedging argument.
Results indicate that across the full sample of adopters, the bid-ask spread 
actually increased following adoption, with the inclusion of a slope dummy 
term yielding a negative and significant coefficient; namely that the adverse 
selection component of the spread decreased post-adoption, relative to the 
pre adoption period. Further tests isolating early adopters from the full 
sample reveal that for this subset, the spread decreased, with no significant 
difference in adverse selection cost between the pre and post adoption period. 
The former effect, however, becomes insignificant upon adding a year fixed 
effect.
Finally, a Heckman (1979) two-step model is estimated in order to test the
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presence of self-selection bias on the part of early adopters. The first stage 
probit model which regresses the choice to early adopt or otherwise, on theo­
retical factors associated with early adoption, indicates that higher perform­
ing, smaller firms, with lower analyst following, and domiciled in countries 
with a traditionally lower disclosure score, are more likely to early adopt. 
Significant self-selection bias exists among early adopting firms, suggesting 
that the private information associated with self-selection is associated with 
a lower bid-ask spread. This result also becomes insignificant upon inclusion 
of a year fixed effect.
Future research examining adverse selection could conduct further en­
quiry into the effect of regulatory change, using the Bollen et al. (2004) 
approach. Extending the IFRS line of enquiry, it may be fruitful to con­
duct analyses across ADR (American Depository Receipt) firms subject to 
US GAAP at the time of the switch to the IFRS, which are arguably ’high 
information environment’ firms by comparison. This would provide greater 
understanding of the benefits of accounting standard in information dissem­
ination in general, and IFRS benefits in particular.
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C h ap te r  3
In te rn a tio n a l A ccounting  
S tan d ard s  and  th e  C ost of 
E qu ity
3.1 Introduction
This paper tests the contention that firms that switch to compliance with 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) from local gener­
ally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) experience a reduction in their 
cost of equity following the change. The recent global trend towards the 
adoption of the IFRS marks the most significant accounting event in recent 
history (IFAD, 2002), resulting in a likely shift in the financial information 
environment. Following widespread official adoption from 2005, this chapter 
examines the extent to which widely anticipated cost of capital reduction 
effects (EC, 2002) have been realised, and identifies moderating characteris-
°The term official here is analogous to mandatory adoption; the systemic requirement 
to produce accounting information pursuant to the IFRS. This may be contrasted with 
voluntary adoption, which occurs in the absence of a mandatory requirement to do so, i.e. 
prior to official adoption.
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tics.
Empirical enquiry into the ability of the IFRS to improve the informa­
tion environment of adopting firms, has yielded mixed results. Covrig et al. 
(2006) find evidence that the IFRS succeed in reducing the home bias among 
foreign investors, particularly for target firms of lower visibility and within 
poorer information environments. Jennings et al. (2004) adds empirical sup­
port to the notion that financial reports prepared under the IFRS are more 
timely and value relevant. After controlling for self-selection bias relating to 
voluntary adoption, they find that firms within countries showing similarity 
between local accounting standards and tax rules are the greatest beneficia­
ries of IFRS adoption. They argue that the marginal benefit is greater for 
such firms given the ancillary importance of external reporting to investors 
within such environments.
Barth et al. (2008) document a decrease in earnings management, more 
timely loss recognition, and greater value relevance following IFRS adoption 
compared to a matched sample of non-IFRS adopters. Finally, Ashbaugh 
and Pincus (2001) find that analyst forecast errors are higher where greater 
differences exist between domestic standards and the IFRS for non-US firms. 
Furthermore, they find that the change in the forecast error between the pre 
and post adoption year are also positive and significantly associated with the 
change in disclosure and measurement requirements brought about by IFRS 
adoption. In sum, the above results add empirical support to the contention 
that the IFRS represent the basis for high quality financial reporting practice.
At odds with such findings, Eccher and Healy (2000) reveal that financial
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reports prepared pursuant to the international standards fail to provide any 
statistically significant benefits over the domestic standards within China. 
They conclude that the distinct environments from which both the PRC 
and IFRS emanated fail to reveal any differences possibly due to lack of 
enforcement of the international standards. Presumably, an environment 
devoid of effective IFRS enforcement potentially allows accounting practices 
that lean towards local practice. Similarly, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) 
document that a voluntary switch to international standards within Germany 
fails to improve the value relevance of income or book value, nor timeliness. 
They conjecture that institutional factors generally, rather than accounting 
standards, potentially play a more critical role in a cross country setting.
Evidence suggestive of cost of capital benefits is even more elusive, with 
either insignificant or weakly significant results dominating the literature. 
One example is Barth et al. (2008), who use the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model to estimate the cost of capital. Barth et al. (2008) adopt 
a matched sample approach, matching country, industry, and size, and ex­
amine the difference prior and subsequent to adoption. Although not stated 
specifically within their paper, in the absence of data to the contrary, it is 
assumed that the pre (post) distinction relates to the voluntary adoption of 
IFRS at the firm level only. As such, each firm is implicitly matched with an 
adopting (non-adopting) firm respectively.
This research offers several contributions to the cost of equity literature. 
Firstly, scant literature exists which examines the association between IFRS 
adoption and the cost of equity using an implied measure. Criticism continues
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to surround the usage of realised returns in the estimation of an ex-post cost 
of equity (e.g. Fama and French, 1997), therefore it is hoped that the present 
research provides more conclusive results than those of Barth et al. (2008). 
Secondly, this research illustrates the use of an implied cost of equity metric 
as the dependent variable in an event study methodology, with the switch 
to the IFRS from domestic standards being the event under investigation. 
Specifically, the sample is matched with an equivalent non-adoption sample, 
controlling for self selection bias arising from firms voluntarily adopting the 
IFRS prior to an official date of national adoption. Recent transitions to the 
IFRS provide a rich dataset from which to conduct such an analysis, whilst 
concurrently disentangling the cost of equity effects prior, and subsequent to 
official adoption. Results, provide only weak evidence that the IFRS succeed 
in reducing the cost of equity, with some mixed results across the specified 
models.
This chapter is structured as follows. The following section details the 
literature which establishes a linkage between disclosure and the cost of eq­
uity. Given the assertions by IFRS proponents that following the IFRS leads 
to greater transparency in financial reporting, and supportive empirical ev­
idence for some countries (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001), an examination of 
the theoretical linkage between greater disclosure (as an analogue to IFRS 
adoption), is an appropriate foundation for hypothesis development. Section 
three details the sample and data, and section four establishes the empirical 
design. Section five reports on the results, and section six concludes.
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3.2 H ypothesis D evelopm ent
Theoretically, financial information affects the cost of capital through its 
reduction in nondiversifiable estimation risk (Klein and Bawa, 1976; Barry 
and Brown, 1985; Coles and Lowenstein, 1988; Handa and Linn, 1973; Coles 
et ah, 1995). A firm’s return and payoff distribution must be estimated using 
both historical and other firm specific data, of which corporate disclosure 
plays a role. For example, Hribar and Jenkins (2004) find that accounting 
restatements lead to an increase in the cost of capital following restatement, 
with the most pronounced effect emerging as a result of auditor initiated 
restatements. Hence, accounting information is shown to affect the cost of 
capital in an empirical setting.
Botosan (1997) provides the earliest evidence on the association between 
the cost of equity and disclosure utilising an implied estimate. Premised 
on the estimation risk literature, she posits a negative association between 
the cost of equity and disclosure. Botosan (1997) regresses a cost of equity 
metric on firm BETA, an ordinal measure of disclosure (DRANK) and market 
value. Although the coefficient or DRANK is negative as predicted, the result 
is not significant. BETA and market value of equity are significantly positive 
and negative respectively. To assess the differential association according to 
high versus low analyst followed hrms, Botosan (1997) estimates the same 
regression model, albeit with the addition of a dummy variable (DU) denoting 
a firm less than or equal to the median number of analysts following the 
sample of firms. The coefficient on DRANK is positive and insignificant. 
Inclusion of an interaction variable (DRANK*DU) yielded a negative and
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significant coefficient, indicating that higher disclosure is associated with a 
lower cost of equity, but only for firms followed by less than the median 
number of analysts.
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) extend Botosan (1997) by substituting the 
fractional rank of Annual Reviews of Corporate Reporting Practices (AIMR) 
disclosure scores with three subsets of corporate disclosure; annual report, 
quarterly, and investor relations. Their sample consists of 3618 total firm- 
year observations, spanning the 11-year period 1986-1996. They draw the 
same conclusion as Botosan (1997), but additionally find that greater fre­
quency in the release of corporate results is actually associated with an in­
crease in the cost of equity. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) suggest a consequent 
increase in stock volatility due to short-termism associated with greater fre­
quency in the release of information as a justification for this finding.
Gebhardt et al. (2001) raise the importance of industry membership as a 
determinant of the cost of equity. Furthermore, they find that the book-to- 
market ratio (B/M) (positively), dispersion in analyst forecasts (negatively), 
long-term growth (positively) are all significantly related to the implied cost 
of capital in multivariate tests. Consistent with Fama and French (1992), 
they conclude a limited role for beta in multi-factor model estimation.
Limited research exists examining the determinants of the cost of equity 
capital within an international setting. Francis et al. (2005) provide one such 
example, hypothesising a positive association between a firm’s need for exter­
nal finance and the level of voluntary disclosure, and a negative association 
between the cost of capital (debt and equity) and voluntary disclosure. They
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suggest that an optimal level of disclosure exists resulting from a trade-off 
between the cost of capital benefit of higher voluntary disclosure, and the 
cost associated with the revelation of proprietary information (Verrecchia, 
1983). Additionally, and in this light, they emphasise that the importance 
of external finance differs across firms, suggesting that levels of voluntary 
disclosure should be an associated variable. Obtaining their external finance 
dependency variable data from Raj an and Zingales (1998), they find a posi­
tive and significant association with the level of voluntary disclosure across all 
specifications. Utilising the Easton (2004) PEG model to estimate the ex ante 
cost of equity, they find that country level factors (a measure of anti-director 
rights and market structure) are significant and negative as predicted, with 
the rate of inflation exhibiting a significant and positive coefficient. The size 
control variable (log of assets) exhibited the only significant coefficient (neg­
ative). Fixed effects variants allow similar inferences, although the adjusted 
R 2 increases substantially.
Given the contemporaneous nature of the introduction of the Interna­
tional Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and the limited cost of capital 
research in the international setting, scant literature exists examining the 
cost of capital effect of IFRS adoption. One example is Barth et al. (2008), 
who use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to estimate the cost 
of capital. Barth et al. (2008) adopt a matched sample approach, matching 
country, industry, and size, and examine the difference prior and subsequent 
to adoption. Although not stated specifically within their paper, in the ab­
sence of data to the contrary, it is assumed that the pre (post) distinction
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relates to the voluntary adoption of IFRS at the firm level only. As such, each 
firm is implicitly matched with an adopting (non-adopting) firm respectively.
There are several inherent limitations with Barth et al. (2008) which this 
research proposes to extend upon. Firstly, the Barth et al. (2008) sample cov­
ers the period 1994-2003, isolating adopting firms and matching pre (post) 
with adopting (non-adopting) firms accordingly. Following 2003, numerous 
countries reported official IFRS adoption, suggesting that the limited sam­
ple reported in Barth et al. (2008) necessitating an ex post cost of capital 
estimate is no longer an issue. As such, an ex ante (implied) cost of equity 
measure is adopted within. Secondly, It is likely that systematic differences 
exist between IFRS adopters prior to an official date of implementation (i.e. 
voluntary or early adopters), and those which must effectively adopt the 
IFRS as a mandatory corporate reporting regime. Finally, no account is 
taken for the extant quality differences between domestic generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) and the IFRS. It is expected that the cost 
of equity effect will differ depending on the magnitude of improvement in 
corporate reporting as a result of the switch. Consistent with the prevailing 
view that improved disclosure should lead to a decrease in the cost of equity, 
it is hypothesised that the IFRS, as considered superior to most financial 
reporting regimes, should achieve this end.
3.3 M easuring th e im plied cost o f equity
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) forward that expected re-
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turns are a linear function of market beta, a notion encapsulated in the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Despite early support for the CAPM 
(Black et ah, 1972; Fama and MacBeth, 1973), more recent research ques­
tions the central role of beta, rather positing that in the latter 1900’s in 
particular, additional variables exhibit a stronger relation with average re­
turns (Fama and French, 1992). In particular, Fama and French (1992) find 
a negative relationship between size (market value of equity) and return in 
univariate tests, and a positive relationship between book-to-market ratio, 
leverage, and return in Fama and Macbeth regressions. Beta maintains an 
insignificant association, with stronger support for the aforementioned vari­
ables. In concluding, Faina and French (1992) suggest that a multifactor 
model incorporating the above variables should be included in models intent 
on estimating the cross section of expected stock returns.
Gebhardt et al. (2001) abandon the notion of estimating the cost of capital 
based on the CAPM and variants thereof due to the imprecision of results 
thus far. In particular (p. 136):
Unfortunately, the cost-of-capital estimates derived from average 
realised returns have proven disappointing in many regards. For 
example, after extensive testing of CAPM and three-factor based 
industry costs-of-capital, Fama and French (1997) conclude that 
these cost of capital estimates are ‘unavoidably imprecise’.
Furthermore, Elton (1999) suggests that the common utilisation of re­
alised returns as a proxy for expected returns is an inappropriate approach.
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Specifically, this argument rests on the assumption that information sur­
prises have a tendency to cancel out over the period under investigation. 
Historically, periods of time may be observed during which stock market re­
alised returns were, on average, lower than the risk-free rate (Elton, 1999), 
an outcome unanticipated at the outset. Additionally, significant informa­
tion events alter the expectation of future returns as they arise, resulting in 
a permanent effect on the realised return.
Gordon and Gordon (1997) suggest that in light of the poor performance 
of the CAPM, expected return models should be tested using analyst fore­
cast data and backing out the discount rate within a dividend discount model 
(Equation (3.1)). In this light, cost of equity estimates within the account­
ing literature predominantly use variants of the dividend discount model in 
calculating an implied cost of capital. The method effectively involves as­
certainment of the internal rate of return (IRR) which equates the present 
value of future cash flows to current stock price (Gebhardt et ah, 2001). The 
dividend discount model is solved for r utilising analyst forecasts of future 
dividends. The main difference between the various specifications regards 
the expected value beyond the forecast horizon, or terminal value.
T
(3.1)
t = 1
Where:
P0— stock price at time 0; 
r = the cost of equity capital
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Eq(.) = the expectations operator; 
dpst = dividends per share
Pastor et al. (2008) provide a recent specification, which is essentially 
identical in form to Equation (3.1), and which is adopted in this paper:
p  _  s r '  F E t+k{ 1 — frt+fc) F E t+T+1
1 “  (1 + re)k re(l + re)
Where T = 15.
Mean earnings pre share analyst forecasts for years t + 1 and t + 2 are 
obtained, with t + 3 estimated as F E t+3 =  E E t+2 x LTG , where LTG  is the 
forecast long term growth estimate. By setting the growth estimate gt+r+1 — 
LRN G D P , where LRNGD P  is the long run nominal GDP growth rate, and 
imposing an exponential rate of decline from ^+3  to gt+r+1, estimates are 
made for all intervening years. In particular, gt+k takes on the following 
functional form:
(3.2)
gt+k gt+k—1 x exp 109(9/91+3) ( T -  1)
(3.3)
Using the calculated values for gt+k{k = 3,..., 15), FE t+3 to FE t+i5 are 
estimated as:
FEt+k — FEt+k~ 1 x (1 + gt+k) (3-4)
With the earnings forecasts now available for tt+\ through to ^+15, the
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next step is to estimate the plowback rates, b, for each year. The plowback 
rate is calculated as (1 — NPt), and NPt = Dt + REPt — N E t , where NPt is 
the payout ratio, Dt is the most recent dividend payout, REPt is the amount 
of common stock repurchased during the year, and N E t is the amount of any 
common stock issuances during the year. The net payout ratio is calculated 
by dividing this figure by net income in year t. Given that g = ROI x b 
(Brealey and Myers, 2002), and that the return on new investments, given 
competition, will equal re in the steady state, b can be solved for each year 
by simple rearrangement. Hence:
As the Pastor et al. (2008) measure is an estimate, a second measure is 
also adopted for robustness. In identifying such a measure, prior literature 
comparing exiting measures is consulted. Botosan and Plumlee (2005) assess 
the relative strength of five widely cited proxies of the implied cost of equity 
by regressing each measure on a number of firm specific risk factors. All 
models build on the dividend discount model, solving for r which equates 
an infinite series of expected future cash flows with current stock price. All 
models however differ in their assumption regarding the terminal value; the 
expectation of future cash flows beyond that available from analyst forecast 
data. The five measures include Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Gebhardt et al. 
(2001), Gordon and Gordon (1997), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), 
Gode and Mohanram (2003), and Easton (2004). Results show a significant
(3.5)
Where b =
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association between the selected risk proxies and the Botosan and Plumlee 
(2002) and Easton (2004) measures of the expected return.
Easton and Monahan (2005) evaluate the reliability of seven expected 
return proxies. Extending previous work such as Guay et al (2003), who 
conduct regressions of realised return on various expected return proxies, 
Easton and Monahan (2005) explicitly control for changes in expectations 
about future cash flows (i.e. earnings surprises). They find that of all proxies 
tested, none exhibit a positive association with realised returns. Even more 
striking is the result that the simplest expected return proxy in terms of data 
requirements, the Easton (2004) PEG model, exhibits no more measurement 
error than any of the other proxies. As such, the metric in question provides a 
useful proxy for the implied cost of equity, albeit without the data restrictions 
likely to emerge for alternate measures. The modified PEG model is as 
follows:
P it =
epSit+2 + r x dpsü -  epsit+x
(3-6)
Alternatively, Hribar and Jenkins (2004), in testing the association be­
tween accounting restatements and the cost of equity, estimate the implied 
cost of equity using multiple measures as a robustness check. They adopt 
Gebhardt et al. (2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Easton and Mon­
ahan (2005) as the three cost of capital metrics. Although the metrics are 
economically different, inferences are invariant to the choice of measure. Con­
sequently, the most appropriate measure, as suggested by Easton and Mon­
ahan (2005) is that which imposes fewest data restrictions. The modified
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PEG model (Easton, 2004) aptly fits this description.
3.4 E m p irica l D esign
The purpose of this chapter is to test the contention that the IFRS result in 
a reduction in the cost of equity. This section therefore develops the models 
used to empirically test the predicted association. Starting with the most in­
tuitive of approaches, Equation 3.7 specifies a univariate association between 
the cost of equity dependent variable, and a dummy variable assuming a 
value of 0 prior to IFRS adoption, and 1 thereafter.
The first model is as follows:
Kn — ßo + ß\ Du + tu (3-7)
Where:
K  = The ext ante cost of equity
o:o — The regression intercept, denoting the average ex ante 
cost of equity in the pre-adoption period 
au =  The regression slope, denoting the average ex ante cost 
of equity capital in the post-adoption period 
Dt = Dummy variable, zero in the pre-adoption period, and 
one in the post-adoption period, 
e = The error term
The model depicted in Equation (3.7) however, is far from perfect, as 
there are likely to be numerous other factors, other than the pre-post dummy
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variable, which affect the cost of equity. Prior literature for example, almost 
unanimously includes a measure of size, typically log of market capitalisa­
tion, as a factor. Previous research suggests that firm size is correlated with 
information availability (Gebhardt et ah, 2001), with large firms likely to 
provide a higher level of financial disclosure due to greater public visibility 
and scrutiny. Furthermore, cross sectional differences in liquidity affect the 
expectation of returns, and given the evidence that smaller firms are typically 
less liquid than larger firms, firm size is predicted to be negatively associ­
ated with the cost of equity. In a similar light, another proxy for information 
availability and visibility is the number of analysts following a firm. Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1996) for example, find that greater analyst following 
is associated with greater liquidity, hence, a multivariate model should also 
consider analyst coverage as an ‘information environment’ proxy.
Intuitively, the greater level of financial risk undertaken by the firm by 
way of debt, the higher the return demanded by equity holders. Therefore, 
consistent with Modigliani and Miller (1958), the cost of equity is positively 
associated with the level of leverage. Gebhardt et al. (2001) also emphasise 
the importance of incorporating a measure of financial leverage in empirical 
models of the cost of equity. Therefore, market leverage, long-term debt to 
market value of equity, is also included as an explanatory variable.
Fama and French (1992) show empirically that the ratio of book value to 
market value of equity (BM) is positively associated with expected returns. If 
BM is considered to be a proxy for the extent to which a firm is undervalued, 
then a higher risk premium should result from this mispricing. Additionally,
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Gebhardt et al. (2001) find that BM is positive and significantly associated 
with the ext ante cost of equity. Given that the association is both positive 
and highly significant in both studies, BM is included as a further explanatory 
variable.
La Porta (1996) and Gebhardt et al. (2001) find that long term growth 
predictions show a negative association with expected returns. In particular, 
La Porta (1996) suggests that the long term growth measure, typically prox- 
ied by the I/B /E /S  LTG  long term growth forecast, is invariably optimistic, 
resulting in overpricing. If stocks are mispriced in this way, they will also 
exhibit a lower cost of equity. However, the feasibility of this association is 
effectively an empirical question. If, on the other hand, the long term growth 
estimates are pessimistic, resulting in underpriced stocks; the cost of equity 
would consequently be higher. Therefore, a specific direction is hard to pre­
dict, and is likely influenced by the ability of analysts to predict long term 
growth with accuracy at any given time. Nevertheless, its association with 
the cost of equity is clear, and hence is included in the multivariate model.
Finally, several other variables are included as controls. A measure of 
the level of disclosure as per CIFAR (1995) is included to control for the 
pre-IFRS adoption level of disclosure, and a measure of corruption as per La 
Porta et al. (1998) is included to account for the level of investor protection 
in a given country. It is predicted that these variables be negatively, and 
positively associated with the cost of equity respectively. Finally, a dummy 
variable indicating whether a firm is an early adopter or official adopter is also 
included. This point is elaborated in further tests later. The multivariate
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model is therefore:
Kn — a0 + otxDt + a2L N S I Z E it + asDMit + a4BM it + a 5N U M E STit
+a6LTGit + a 7EARLYit + a8DISCLOSURE  + a9CORRUPT  
- \~ 6 t (3 -8 )
Where:
K  = 
ao =
« 1  =
D it  —
LNSIZEit  = 
DM  a = 
BM it = 
NUMESTu = 
DEG it = 
EARLYu =
D I S C L O S U R E =
C O R R U P T =
The ex ante cost of equity
The regression intercept, denoting the ex ante cost 
of capital in the pre-adoption period 
The regression slope, denoting the average ex ante 
cost of capital in the post-adoption period 
Dummy variable, zero in the pre-adoption period, 
and one in the post-adoption period.
Log of market capitalisation for firm i at time t. 
The debt-to-market ratio at time t.
The book-to-market ratio at time t.
The number of analyst forecasts at time t.
The long term growth estimate at time t.
Dummy variable, one if the firm is an early 
adopter, and zero otherwise.
The country level disclosure score at 1995 (i.e. pre 
adoption).
The country level corruption index score.
Prior research tends to express the dependent variable in terms of a return
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premium, i.e. in excess of an appropriate risk free rate. Furthermore, there 
are undoubtedly fluctuations in economic activity across countries and time, 
which affect the returns demanded by equity holders. In light of this, and 
to overcome the complexity of gathering such data across countries, fixed 
effects models incorporating country and time fixed effects are also run as 
robustness checks of the above models.1
Whether there is in fact a difference on the aforementioned associations 
in the pre vs post IFRS period, is also of interest. In order to isolate such 
an effect, additional terms interacting each existing predictor (with the ex­
ception of D ISCLO SU RE  and CORRUPT), with D are included as an 
additional empirical model. Namely:
Ru — £*0 + Qq Da + 0 L2 LN S I  Z En 4- a3DMit + cx^BMa + a 3NU M ESTa 
H—f- a6LTGt 4  a 7E A R L Y  -F otgD * DAlt 4  ctgD * BAIt 
AotioD * NU AI E STtf 4  ol\\D  * LTGn cx\2 D * E ARLYn 
+a13D ISCLO SU RE  + a u CORRUPT  +  et (3.9)
Where the variables are as defined for Equation 3.8.
1 These problems are addressed later in this chapter, with each sample firm matched 
with a control group on country, year, and industry; defining an abnormal cost of equity. 
However such a matching procedure is incredibly restrictive on the sample, hence the raw 
cost of equity is used at this juncture as a first step.
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3.4 .1  Self S election  B ias
Prior literature documents systematic differences between firms which vol­
untarily adopt the IFRS, and those which do not. As such, a problem may 
arise due to voluntary adopters essentially self-selecting into IFRS report­
ing. Shehata (1991) identifies the prevalence of self selection bias in extant 
literature examining the economic consequences of accounting choice. In 
particular, the decision to adopt a given financial reporting method is not 
a random process. Rather, managers rationally make decisions according to 
the perceived comparative advantage of doing so, which, in the case of an 
accounting choice; is cited as related to firm characteristics.
Originating with Heckman (1979), the notion of self-selection may be 
viewed as giving rise to an omitted variable problem. Li and Prabhala (2007) 
illustrate this as follows. Assume that the following regression requires esti­
mation:
Yi = X iß + ei (3.10)
Assume now, that a sub-sample of firms self selects into choice E. For this 
sub-sample of firms, the applicable regression equation becomes:
Yi\E = X t f  + €i\E (3.11)
As the self-selected sub sample is not random, failure to account for self­
selection results in inconsistent ß estimators. In correcting for self selection 
bias, the first step requires identification of factors likely to explain the de-
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cision to self-select. I.e:
E = Wi = Zi 7 + r]i > 0 (3.12)
Where Wi is the selection variable, typically a dichotomous variable de­
noted as 1 for selection, and 0 otherwise. Zi is a vector of public exogenous 
variables, 7 is a vector of coefficients, and rji is an error term orthogonal to 
7. It therefore implies that the equivalent expression for non-selection, N E , 
is as follows:
Therefore, to estimate Equation 3.10 in the presence of self selection, and 
taking its expectation, and substituting in 3.12, the expression becomes:
The expression in 3.14 follows from the notion that =  7rr)i + v*, 
a regression of e* on 77^, where n is therefore the coefficient, and Vi is the 
orthogonal error term. An equivalent expression for firms which do not self 
select into the choice under investigation may similarly be derived, by substi­
tuting Equation 3.13 into Equation 3.10. Taking expectations, and denoting 
the second term in Equation 3.14 as Xc(Zi'y), Li and Prabhala (2007) present 
the following expression, which captures the essence of Heckman (1979):
N E  = Wi = Z%1 + rji < 0 (3.13)
Yi\E — Xiß  +  (eilZi'y +  r]i > 0)
— X iß  - f  7 r ( e ; |Z ;7  + r]i > 0) + z>i (3.14)
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E(Yt\C) = X tß + K \c(Za ) (3.15)
Where 7r is the coefficient on the inverse mills ratio, and C denotes the 
choice to self select, or otherwise, by the firm. Examination of 3.15 clearly 
reveals the omitted variable problem. Estimation of 3.10 omits the final term 
in Equation 3.15, which arises due to a subset of firms self selecting into a 
given choice. Voluntary adoption into a particular disclosure regime, or in 
this case, early adoption, provides a classic example of the self selection prob­
lem. Therefore, a 2-step Heckman estimation to account for potential self 
selection bias requires, in addition to a vector of explanatory variables Xj, 
but also a vector Z{ of public variables which, according to theory, are ex­
pected to predict the self selection decision. The following section elaborates 
the choice of Z* as applicable to this paper; firm specific variables associated 
with early IFRS adoption.
Early adoption: P rob it m odel to  account for self-selection
Disclosure literature in accounting suggests systematic characteristics of firms 
which opt into a higher quality financial reporting regime, or voluntarily 
provide financial disclosure above a minimum requirement. For example, 
Healy et al. (1999) finds that firms which have higher visibility are more 
inclined to provide voluntary disclosure, with large firms being more trans­
parent (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Lang and Lundholm, 1993), as are cross 
listed firms (Lang et ah, 2003).
In terms of adoption of international accounting standards in particular,
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Dumontier and Raffournier (1998), drawing a sample of Swiss firms, find 
that global dependence, proxied by both the proportion of total sales outside 
Switzerland in addition to sales outside Europe, and size; are both signifi­
cantly greater for IAS2 compared to non-IAS firms. Ashbaugh (2001) lends 
further insight into the characteristics of firms which voluntarily report pur­
suant to either the international accounting standards (IAS) or United States 
(US) Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). She hypothesises 
that voluntarily adoption of either IAS or US GAAP is a function of 1) the 
number of foreign listings, 2) the number or stock issuances, and 3) the do­
mestic financial reporting requirements of the firm. Ashbaugh (2001) finds 
positive and significant coefficients on the choice of IFRS/US GAAP stan­
dards and US listing (at the 0.01 level), the number of markets listed, and 
firm size (both at the 0.05 level).
Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) conduct a similar analysis to Ashbaugh 
(2001), albeit limiting their sample to European Union (EU) domiciled firms, 
and examining the effect of regime choice on 1) the cost of equity, 2) analyst 
following, and 3) stock return volatility. They argue that net benefits of non­
local GAAP adoption accrue primarily to firms reliant on the international 
capital market. Firms which are cross-listed on two or more stock markets 
increase the level of disclosure, both on a voluntary and mandatory basis. 
As such, and consistent with Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001), they hypothesise 
that the benefits of non-local GAAP adoption increases with the number of
2the International Accounting Standards (IAS) are the early standards developed by 
the then International Accounting Standards Committee. Standards developed by the 
IASB are termed the IFRS
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foreign listings.
Irrespective of the level of cross-listing activity, consistent with the find­
ings of Dumontier and Raffournier (1998), El-Gazzar et al. (1999) and Mur­
phy (1999), Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) find that a greater degree of foreign 
operations leads to high non-local GAAP adoption. In brief, Cuijpers and 
Buijink (2005) reveal that a greater number of foreign listings, poor quality 
domestic GAAP, permission to adopt IFRS, and firm size are significantly 
related to the decision to adopt non-local GAAP. Upon also considering the 
theoretical notion that better performing firms are likely more likely to vol­
untarily disclose (Verrecchia, 1983), and hence early adopt the IFRS, the 
following first-stage probit model is specified:
Ct = ß0 + ßi LN SIZEit + faEPSit + ßzFSALESit + ß tLISTINGSit 
+ßbN U M E STit + ßeDISCLOSEi + ß7CORRUPTi +  eit (3.16)
Where:
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Ci =
LN SIZE u = 
E PSit =
FSALESü =
LISTINGSit  = 
NUMESTit = 
DISCLOSEi =
C O R R U P T =
A dichotomous variable assuming a value of 1 if 
the firm is a voluntary adopter, or 0 otherwise. 
The natural log of size for i at time t 
Earnings per share scaled by stock price for firm i 
at time t
Foreign sales as a proportion of total sales for firm 
i at time t
The number of foreign listings for firm i at time t 
The number of analysts following firm i at time t 
Local GAAP based disclosure/transparency score 
for firm i
a corruption index score, as per La Porta et al.
( 1998).
Time t denotes the time of the switch to the IFRS, or more specifically, 
the most recent data prior to adoption.
With a first stage model and hence means of ascertaining Heckman’s 
Lambda at hand, a second stage model correcting for self selection may 
be specified. At this point, it is prudent to consider the shortcomings of 
merely utilising a raw cost of equity measure as the dependent variable. In 
particular, country specific and time variant factors such as the risk-free rate 
and the level of economic activity, may influence a given data point. As a 
rectification the following model defines an abnormal cost of equity for each 
early adopter, for each of the two cost of equity metrics. The method is simply 
the cost of equity of each sample early adopter, less the mean cost of equity
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of a comparison group of similar non adopters. The matching criteria being 
firstly on country, year, then consistent with Lyon and Barber (1997), 4-digit 
industry code, and size within the range of 70-130% (sample permitting). 
Given the abnormal cost of equity now as the dependent variable, coupled 
with the inclusion of Heckman’s Lambda, the following regression model is 
specified:
AbKit — Qo -|- ot\Dit T 012L N S IZ En T ql^ DMh -f- ol^ BM u 4- ot^NUM E ST^ 
+a6LTGit + a7EARLYi +  a 8D ISC LO SU RE  +  a 9CORRUPT  
-\-ol\qL A M BD A it T €t (3.17)
Where:
AbK = 
Dt =
DMt -  
BM t = 
N U M ESTt = 
LTGt =
The ex ante abnormal cost of equity, i.e. Kit — 
K ctrl
Dummy variable, zero in the pre-adoption period, 
and one in the post-adoption period.
The debt-to-market ratio at time t.
The book-to-market ratio at time t.
The number of analyst forecasts at time t.
The long term growth estimate at time t.
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E A R L Y =
D I S C L O S U R E =
C O R R U P T =  
LAMBDA =
Dummy variable, one if the firm is an early 
adopter, and zero otherwise.
The country level disclosure score at 1995 (i.e. pre 
adoption).
The country level corruption index score. 
Heckman’s Lambda.
The error term
3.5 D ata
As the primary item of interest, the switch date to IFRS is firstly ascertained 
for as many global firms as possible. The window of inclusion is 1998-2008, 
chosen as it closely corresponds with improvements made to the standards 
to conform with revisions to the standards necessary to gain International 
Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) endorsement (Epstein and 
Mirza, 2004). Data for identification of this event is obtained from World- 
scope, which details the accounting standards adopted, as reported in finan­
cial reports, on an annual basis. From the universe of Worldscope firms, 
and subsequent to the exclusion of all firms within countries with no IFRS 
adoption and firms with missing data, the preliminary sample size is 18762 
firms.
The IFRS switch year is the first identified year where financial reports are 
noted as having been prepared according to the IFRS. For this, annual data 
on the standards adopted by each sample firm are obtained from Worldscope, 
with a ’switch’ being identified when t=IFRS and t-l=domestic standards.
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The Worldscope data also note ’hybrid’ adoption by some firms, for example, 
in the case where the IFRS are partially complied with alongside the extant 
domestic standards. For the purpose of this exercise, all such firms were 
excluded to avoid contamination of the sample. A switch year is identified 
for 5856 firms, 571 of which are identified as early adopters.3
Data necessary to calculate the two cost of capital measures, Easton 
(2004) and Pastor et al. (2008), henceforth denoted Rmpeg and Rpss re­
spectively are obtained from a number of sources. All analyst forecast esti­
mates are obtained from I/B /E /S , covering the entire window of inclusion. 
To calculate R mpeg» one and two-year consensus forecasts from I/B /E /S  are 
used, and dividend data is from Compustat Global.
To calculate Rpss one and two-year ahead forecasts from I/B /E /S  are 
also used, in addition to the consensus long term growth estimate provided 
by I/B /E /S. In order to forecast beyond t + 3, an assumption is made that 
the steady state growth rate in year t + T  + 2 is equal the rolling average 
of the annual nominal GDP growth rate within the market of domicile. The 
value for each year is based on a rolling average of all prior years figures, 
given data availability, with data for most countries available starting from 
1961. These figures are nominalised by adding to the rolling average GDP 
growth rate, the rolling average of the annual inflation GDP deflator, also 
obtained from the World Bank.
The data required for DM  and B M  obtained Compustat Global, and
3The IASPLUS website (http://www.iasplus.com) provided the primary source of offi­
cial adoption dates by country, enabling delineation of early from ’official’ adopters.
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market capitalisation for L N S I Z E  is obtained from Worldscope. Addition­
ally, N U M E S T  and LEG , are obtained from I/B /E /S , DISCLO SU R E , is 
obtained from CIFAR (1995) and CORRUPT , is obtained from La Porta 
et al. (1998). Finally, the remaining data required for estimating the probit 
specification are obtained from Worldscope.
In order to examine the IFRS effect in a pre vs post framework, data is 
required for the 10 months pre and 10 months post the IFRS adoption month. 
The choice of 10 months is to capture the effect over a year pre vs post, after 
discarding the month of the first IFRS earnings announcement (t=0), and 
also t= -l, where t is used here to denote firm-month observations. Given 
the sample of adopters (n=5856), the requirement of 20 observations results 
in 117,120 firm-month observations. Firstly, to reduce the effect of outliers 
in the cost of equity estimates, the top and bottom 2.5% of observations 
were removed based on each of the two measures. To maintain balance in 
pre and post observations, any firm which did not yield exactly 10 pre and 
10 post observations is removed from the sample. Furthermore, to enable 
comparison between the two cost of equity measures, only the subset of firms 
which have observations for R mpeg and Rpss are included in the sample. 
After accounting for missing observations on the remaining variables, the final 
sample is 2700, comprising 1350 pre-IFRS and 1350 post-IFRS observations.
3.6 R esu lts
The effect of IFRS adoption on the cost of equity is examined as follows. 
Firstly, descriptive statistics by country and pre vs post IFRS adoption are
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presented respectively. Next, estimation of Equations (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9), 
followed by equivalent fixed effects models, are detailed. In these models, 
of particular interest is the dummy variable D , which essentially isolates the 
effect of IFRS adoption via the pre vs post delineation. Finally, to control for 
the potential for self selection bias, a two-stage Heckman model is estimated, 
drawing upon the probit specification in Equation (3.16).
3.6.1 D escr ip tiv e  S ta tistics
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables drawn upon for the 
regression models, reported by country. With the exception of a few notable 
cases, most strikingly Australia and South Africa, the estimate of Rpss, 
henceforth denoted as simply R, is consistently lower than Rmpeg-, hence­
forth denoted as M P E G , across the sample. This observation is in line with 
prior research comparing cost of equity metrics. Descriptive statistics in the 
pre-IFRS vs the post-IFRS period (Table ?? show a marginal decrease in 
both cost of equity measures in the post-period. Additionally, the number of 
analysts following the sample of firms increased, on average, from about 11 
to over 12.
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Table 3.3 presents cross-correlations between the cost of equity measures, 
and the dependent variables used in the analysis. Notably, the two cost of 
equity measures are positively correlated (p = 0.242 in the pre-IFRS period, 
and p = 0.2717 in the post period), which is not unexpected given that they 
are merely alternate means of ex ante cost of equity estimation. Secondly, 
size is negatively associated with both R and M P E G , and interestingly, this 
association has a greater negative magnitude in the post-IFRS period. Con­
trary to intuition and prior evidence, both DM  and B M  exhibit a negative 
correlation with both R  and MPEG.  Finally, N U MEST,  which is analyst 
following, is negatively, and LTG , being the estimate of long term growth, 
is positively associated with the cost of equity.
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3.6 .2  R egression  R esu lts
The first set of regression results are presented in Table 3.4. Firstly, a ba­
sic univariate model is estimated using both R  and M PEG  (presented as 
specifications (1) and (2) respectively). The R  measure is negative and sig­
nificant (t = —2.60), and indicating a 150 basis point reduction in the cost of 
equity in the post-adoption period. While the M P E G  measure is negative 
as predicted, but now only significant at the 10% level. The multivariate 
specification (depicted as (3) and (4) for R and M P E G  as the dependent 
variables respectively), reveals this time that the coefficient on D is negative, 
but marginally insignificant, with the specification (4) coefficient on D once 
again insignificant. Contrary to prior literature (e.g. Gebhardt et al. (2001)), 
both DM  and B M  are negative and significant, as reported in (3) and (4). 
The negative result on DM  in particular, makes little sense intuitively, and 
coupled with the result on B M , may potentially be explained by country 
specific factors not captured by this model.
N U M E S T  is negative and significant for specification (4), as predicted, 
meaning that firms with greater analyst following exhibit a lower cost of 
equity. This implies that the information environment generally, and the in­
volvement of information intermediaries in particular, are important drivers 
in lowering the cost of equity. Although the direction is as predicted, N U M E S T  
is insignificant for specification (3). LTG is positive and significant, for (3) 
and (4), but less significant for the latter. While contrary to prior empirical 
evidence such as La Porta (1996) and Gebhardt et al. (2001), but consistent 
with the notion that the LTG forecast provided by I/B /E /S  may indeed to
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Table 3.4 -  Results: Pre-post IFRS earnings announcement regression
R esults of estim ating  the  following regression model:
K n  =  <*o +  ol\D i +  ot^DMt +  a ^ B M t  +  ot^NU M  E ST t  +  a ^L T G t  +
+ a 6E A R L Y  +  a 6D IS C L O S U R E  + a 7C O R R U P T  +  et
Identical m odels are estim ated  each w ith R  (models 1, 3 and 5) and M P E G  (m odels 2, 4 and 6) as 
dependent variables. D  is a dum m y variable assum ing a value of 0 in th e  pre adoption  period, and 1 in 
th e  post period. L N S I Z E  is th e  log of m arket cap italisation , D M  is th e  deb t to  m arket ra tio  and B M  
is th e  book to  m arket ratio . N U M E S T  is th e  num ber of analysts following a  given firm, L T G  is the  
long term  growth ra te  provided by I /B /E /S ,  and E A R L Y  is a  dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 1 if 
a  firm is an early adopter, and 0 otherw ise. D I S C L O S U R E  is a  country  level disclosure score as per 
CIFA R (1995), and C O R R U P T  is a  corruption  index score as used by L a P o rta  e t al. (1998). T -sta tistic s 
are reported  below th e  coefficient estim ates in parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and 
au tocorrela tion  in th e  residuals.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IN T E R C E P T  
D
LNSIZE 
DM 
BM
NU M EST 
LTG 
EARLY 
DISCLO SURE 
C O R R U PT  
D*LNSIZE 
D*DM 
D*BM 
D*N UM EST 
D*LTG 
D*EARLY
O bservations 2700 2700
R 2 0.008545 0.001154
0.0670 0.0815 0.0012 0.0601
(0.67) (1.97) (0.01) (1.31)
-0.0083 0.0007 0.1445 0.0470
(-1.75) (0.33) (1.72) (2.87)
-0.0002 0.0001 0.0049 0.0013
(-0.04) (0.04) (0.61) (0.65)
-0.0362 -0.0102 -0.0486 -0.0010
(-2.35) (-1.07) (-2.81) (-0.10)
-0.0388 -0.0150 -0.0393 -0.0094
(-2.67) (-2.13) (-1.98) (-1.29)
-0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0021 -0.0009
(-1.32) (-1.99) (-1.62) (-2.36)
0.3636 0.0548 0.4563 0.0549
(2.91) (1.78) (3.87) (1.84)
-0.0165 0.0081 -0.0216 0.0059
(-1.33) (0.56) (-1.34) (0.34)
0.0014 0.0001 0.0014 0.0001
(3.15) (0.26) (3.18) (0.27)
-0.0058 0.0037 -0.0068 0.0036
(-1.56) (1.15) (-1.80) (1.11)
-0.0104 -0.0028
(-1.53) (-2.60)
0.0193 -0.0171
(0.98) (-2.98)
0.0009 -0.0107
(0.08) (-3.29)
0.0019 0.0002
(1.79) (0.78)
-0.2838 0.0038
(-2.76) (0.18)
0.0175 0.0045
(1.55) (0.58)
2700 2700 2700 2700
0.1634 0.1296 0.1859 0.1405
0.1105 0.1141
(9.71) (33.72)
-0.0151 -0.0019
(-2.60) (-0.89)
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pessimistic, resulting in underpricing. Given the global dataset used here, a 
possibility of home bias in the LTG forecast may be present. Although no 
attempt is made here to identify the location of individual analysts and hence 
disentangle a home bias effect, specifications (5) and (6) isolates the pre-post 
effect. Finally, DISCLOSURE  is significantly positive in specification (3) 
only, contrary to expectation.
Finally, specifications (5) and (6) in Table 3.4 add slope dummy variables 
in an attempt to disentangle post-IFRS effects. The prior results from (3) 
and (4) remain intact. Notable exceptions include the positive and signifi­
cant coefficient on D for specification (6), suggesting that the cost of equity 
increased following IFRS adoption, if measured using MPEG.  the result in 
the R  regression (5) supports this conclusion, albeit at a lower level of statis­
tical significance. Turning to the results on the slope dummies, of particular 
interest is the result on D*LTG  in specification (5), and D * S I Z E , D * D M  
and D * B M  in specification (6). The D * LTG result indicates that the cost 
of equity decreased post-IFRS for firms exhibiting higher expected long term 
growth. If the positive coefficient previously documented for LTG in speci­
fications (3) and (4) is due to pessimism, then the possibility exists that the 
role of the IFRS may indeed reduce the home bias effect. The negative and 
significant result on D * L N S I Z E  indicates that large firms enjoy a cost of 
equity reduction post-IFRS, as do firms with higher leverage, and book to 
market.
Table 3.5 presents the results of similar models to those shown in Table 
3.4, but upon controlling for country and year fixed effects. The country level
89
Table 3.5 -  Results: Pre-post IFRS earnings announcement regression - Country 
and year fixed effects
R esults of estim ating  the  following regression model:
K u  —  c*o +  ot\Dt + (*2 DMt  +  a sB M t  +  ot\NU M  E ST t  +  a ^L T G t  +
+ a& E A R LY et
Identical m odels are estim ated  each w ith  R  (m odels 1, 3 and  5) and  M P E G  (m odels 2, 4 and  6) as 
dependent variables. D is a  dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 0 in th e  pre adoption  period, and 1 in 
the  post period. L N S I Z E  is th e  log of m arket cap italisation , D M  is th e  deb t to  m arket ra tio  and B M  
is th e  book to  m arket ratio . N U M E S T  is the  num ber of analysts following a  given firm, L T G  is the  
long term  growth ra te  provided by I /B /E /S ,  and E A R L Y  is a  dum m y variable assum ing a value of 1 if 
a firm is an early adopter, and 0 otherw ise. T -sta tistics are reported  below th e  coefficient estim ates in 
parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and au tocorrela tion  in th e  residuals.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IN T E R C E P T  0.2178 0.1536
(74.93) (142.39)
D -0.0151 -0.0019
(-2.59) (-0.89)
LNSIZE
DM
BM
NU M EST
LTG
EARLY
D*LNSIZE
D*DM
D*BM
D*N UM EST
D*LTG
D* EARLY
0.1527 0.1604 0.0856 0.1364
(1.08) (5.73) (0.52) (4.34)
-0.0096 0.0006 0.1514 0.0538
(-2.32) (0.26) (1.73) (3.06)
-0.0007 -0.0012 0.0046 0.0004
(-0.09) (-0.56) (0.45) (0.15)
-0.0275 -0.0126 -0.0412 -0.0038
(-1.06) (-1.02) (-1.25) (-0.34)
-0.0295 -0.0183 -0.0288 -0.0116
(-1.33) (-2.05) (-1.24) (-1.38)
-0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0018 -0.0007
(-0.84) (-1.72) (-1.23) (-2.54)
0.3249 0.0369 0.4088 0.0343
(2.17) (1.12) (2.91) (1.07)
-0.0014 0.0280 -0.0070 0.0258
(-0.11) (1.55) (-0.48) (1.34)
-0.0109 -0.0035
(-1.58) (-2.77)
0.0197 -0.0154
(0.90) (-4.03)
-0.0008 -0.0116
(-0.07) (-3.36)
0.0020 0.0004
(1.93) (1.28)
-0.2973 0.0090
(-2.73) (0.46)
0.0197 0.0050
(1.62) (0.65)
O bservations 2700 2700 2700 2700 2700 2700
R 2 0.1289 0.3153 0.1823 0.3769 0.2063 0.3884
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variables, naturally, DISCLOSURE  and CORRUPT  are dropped here. 
Inferences drawn in the fixed-effects model are consistent with the results in 
3.4.
Table 3.6 presents the results of the probit model in Equation 3.16. As 
part of the first stage of the Heckman two-step estimation, this examines 
the possibility that factors exist which are associated with firms opting into 
the IFRS prior to an official adoption date. The dependent variable here, 
C, is a dummy asuming a value of 1 where the firm is an early adopter, and 
0 otherwise. Given the sample of early adopters, a significant and positive 
coefficient is present on DISCLOSE RE. This may be due to firms within 
countries with more transparent accounting regimes being more agreeable 
to the IFRS, potentially as they are more similar to the extant domestic 
standards, allowing a smooth transition. Additionally, the coefficient on 
L IS T IN G S  is negative and weakly significant. This is contrary to the prior 
literature which finds that greater international financial dependance, proxied 
for one by the number of foreign listings, is associated with a tendency to 
voluntarily adopt the IFRS.
Finally, Tables 3.7 and 3.8, present the results of estimating Equation 
3.17, and variants thereof. As before, the odd numbered specifications are 
those where R  is the dependent variable, and the even are those where 
M PEG  is used. The first four specifications (1-4), identical to the previ­
ously presented results, are merely provided for comparison with the self 
selection controlled models (5-8). The reduced sample size however, is due 
to 1) The matching process necessary to calculate AbK, the abnormal ex
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Table 3.6 -  Results: Probit model of determinants of early adoption
R esults of estim ating  th e  following prob it model:
Ci =  ß0 + ß i L N S I Z E u  +  ß2 E P S t t  +  ß3 F S A L E S u  +  ß4L I S T I N G S it 
+ß5N U M E S T it +  ß eD IS C L O S E i  + ß7C O R R U P T i  +  eit
C  is a  dichotom ous variable assum ing a  value of 1 if the  firm is an  early adopter, and 0 if the  firm 
adopts a t  th e  official country  level adoption  da te , L N S I Z E  is th e  log of m arket cap italisation , E P S  is 
earnings per share scaled by price, F S A L E S  is th e  level of foreign sales as a percentage of to ta l sales, 
A N A L Y S T S  is th e  num ber of analysts following th e  firm, L I S T I N G S  is th e  num ber of foreign exchange 
listings, D IS C L O S U R E  is a  country  level disclosure score as per CIFA R (1995), and C O R R U P T  is a 
corrup tion  index score as used by La P o rta  e t al. (1998). T -sta tis tic s  are reported  below th e  coefficient 
estim ates in parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and au tocorrela tion  in th e  residuals.
Variable
IN T E R C E P T -4.4038
(-2.06)
LNSIZE 0.0598
(0.95)
EPS 0.0283
(1.20)
FSALES -0.0024
(-1.06)
LISTINGS -0.0755
(-1.89)
N U M EST -0.0043
(-0.26)
DISCLO SURE 0.0728
(3.18)
O bservations 6585
R-Square 0.0874
M ax-rescaled 0.1708
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ante cost of equity, and hence the inclusion of early adopters only as sample 
firms.4 Notably, the coefficient on D is insignificant across all specifications, 
indicating that the abnormal cost of equity following adoption is no different 
than prior to adoption. LTG is highly significant, which is a similar result to 
that previously documented, again, only where R  is the dependent variable.
The result on D * N U M E S T  is negative and significant, whether con­
trolled for self-selection bias or otherwise. Therefore unlike the previous 
results on this variable, the cost of equity relative to the benchmark non­
adopters, is lower following adoption, for firms that have greater analyst 
following. This result is only negative and significant where R  is the depen­
dent variable (i.e (3) and (7)). The inclusion of LAM BDA,  produces little 
difference. Apart from the negative and weakly significant result on this 
variable in specification (6), LA M B D A  is insignificant. It can therefore be 
concluded that for the sample of early adopters included here, self-selection 
does not appear to be a factor.
Table 3.8 presents the fixed-effects (country and year) equivalent of 3.7 
as a robustness check. With the exception of the now insignificant coefficient 
on L A M B D A  in (6), the results are otherwise identical to those presented 
in 3.7.
4 Recall that the cost of equity for these firms is abnormal relative to a comparison of 
non adopters at the time, which are largely official adopters. Hence, each sample firm in 
these tests are early adopters only
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Table 3.7 -  Results: Early adopters relative to matched official adopters
R esults of estim ating  th e  following regression model:
AbKn = c*o + a \D t  + <X2DMt + a ^ B M t + cx^NU M  E ST t  +  a ^L T G t  +
+ q  6E A R L Y  +  c* 7  D IS C L O S U R E  +  a 8C O R R U P T  +  a 9L A M B D A  +  et
Identical models are estim ated  each m easure of AbK  denoted  as R D I F F  (m odels 1, 3, 5 and 8) and 
M P E G D I F F  (m odels 2, 4, 6 and 8) as dependent variables. D is a  dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 
0 in th e  pre adoption  period, and 1 in th e  post period. L N S I Z E  is th e  log of m arket capitalisation , D M  
is th e  deb t to  m arket ra tio  and B M  is th e  book to  m arket ra tio . N U M E S T  is th e  num ber of analysts 
following a  given firm, L T G  is the  long term  grow th ra te  provided by I /B /E /S .  D IS C L O S U R E  is a 
country  level disclosure score as per CIFA R (1995), and  C O R R U P T  is a corrup tion  index score as used 
by La P o rta  e t al. (1998). L A M B D A  is H eckm an’s L am bda for self selection bias correction. T -sta tistic s 
are reported  below the  coefficient estim ates in parentheses, and are corrected  for heteroscedasticity  and 
au tocorrela tion  in th e  residuals.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IN T E R C E P T -0.0247 -0.0110 0.5504 -0.0187 -0.0246 -0.0008 0.4757 -0.0864
(-0.91) (-1.55) (1.45) (-0.19) (-0.51) (-0.09) (1.17) (-0.68)
D 0.0198 0.0056 -0.1144 0.0466 0.0275 0.0062 0.0126 -0.0207
(1.22) (0.91) (-0.82) (0.55) (1.11) (0.81) (-0.31) (-0.18)
LNSIZE -0.0190 -0.0020 -0.0110 -0.0054
(-1.48) (-0.44) (-0.71) (-0.80)
BM - 0.0000 -0.0079 -0.0546 -0.0402
(-0.00) (-0.17) (-0.44) (-2.63)
DM -0.0947 -0.0231 -0.0466 0.0055
(-1.25) (-1.72) (-0.94) (0.10)
NU M EST 0.0019 -0.0014 0.0007 -0.0007
(0.98) (-1.73) (0.29) (-0.68)
LTG 0.6115 -0.0222 0.6134 -0.0205
(11.71) (-1.21) (11.51) (-0.97)
D*LNSIZE 0.0108 -0.0018 0.0029 0.0033
(0.80) (-0.27) (0.31) (0.38)
D*DM 0.0159 -0.0278 0.0737 -0.0532
(1.13) (-0.56) (1.49) (-1.01)
D*BM 0.0313 -0.0170 0.0141 0.0090
(1.30) (1.53) (0.16) (1.17)
D*NUM EST -0.0026 -0.0005 -0.0030 -0.0015
(-5.84) (-0.46) (-8.02) (-1.14)
D*LTG -0.0056 0.0054 -0.0385 0.0035
(-0.09) (0.14) (-0.49) (0.07)
DISCLO SURE 0.0024 0.0003 0.0017 0.0023
(0.80) (0.32) (0.33) (1.08)
C O R R U PT -0.0564 0.0048 -0.0546 0.0016
(-2.19) (0.40) (-2.34) (0.13)
LAMBDA 0.0067 -0.0282 -0.0280 0.0415
(0.05) (-1.84) (-0.48) (1.09)
Observations 896 896 896 896 762 762 762 762
R? 0.002615 0.003570 0.2372 0.1812 0.005068 0.01429 0.2634 0.1822
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Table 3.8 -  Results: Early adopters relative to matched official adopters - Country 
and year fixed effects
R esults of estim ating  th e  following regression model:
AbKn  =  a®-\-a.\Dt + & 2 D M t M E S T t c x ^ L T G t - \ -  
F a ^ E A R L Y  +  ar jL A M B D A  +  et
Identical m odels are estim ated  each m easure of AbK  denoted  as R D I F F  (m odels 1, 3, 5 and  8) and 
M P E G D I F F  (m odels 2, 4, 6 and  8) as dependent variables. D is a  dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 
0 in th e  pre adoption  period, and 1 in th e  post period. L N S I Z E  is th e  log of m arket cap italisation , D M  
is the  deb t to  m arket ra tio  and B M  is th e  book to  m arket ratio . N U M E S T  is th e  num ber of analysts 
following a  given firm, L T G  is th e  long term  growth ra te  provided by I /B /E /S .  L A M B D A  is H eckm an’s 
Lam bda for self selection bias correction. T -sta tistics are reported  below th e  coefficient estim ates in 
parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and au tocorrela tion  in th e  residuals.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IN T E R C E P T 0.1447 -0.0534 0.3977 -0.0739 0.1212 -0.0722 -0.4610 -0.0326
(1.49) (-3.01) (0.64) (-0.80) (1.06) (-2.78) (-1.62) (-0.28)
D 0.0194 0.0081 -0.2509 0.0269 0.0215 0.0059 0.2947 -0.0031
(0.98) (1.00) (-0.79) (0.41) (1.14) (0.69) (1.29) (-0.03)
LNSIZE -0.0242 0.0021 0.0242 -0.0015
(-0.75) (0.38) (1.55) (-0.21)
BM -0.0051 -0.0187 0.1070 -0.0782
(-0.02) (-0.46) (0.94) (0.53)
DM -0.1240 -0.0277 0.0732 -0.0301
(-0.98) (-0.95) (0.58) (-0.63)
NUM EST 0.0027 -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0006
(1.03) (-1.25) (-0.88) (-0.42)
LTG 0.5416 -0.0055 0.5769 -0.0071
(6.44) (-0.23) (11.05) (-0.26)
D*LNSIZE 0.0196 0.0002 -0.0173 0.0018
(0.83) (0.03) (-0.99) (0.25)
D*DM 0.0739 -0.0220 0.0491 -0.0145
(1.27) (-0.44) (0.33) (-0.26)
D*BM 0.0649 -0.0144 -0.1060 0.0072
(0.89) (-1.04) (-1.17) (0.45)
D*NUM EST -0.0032 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0011
(-2.00) (-0.88) (-2.05) (-0.80)
D*LTG 0.0474 -0.0020 0.0375 -0.0007
(0.40) (-0.05) (0.31) (-0.01)
LAMBDA -0.1447 0.0213 0.0338 0.0193
(-1.12) (0.54) (0.45) (0.50)
Observations 896 896 896 896 762 762 762 762
R? 0.1622 0.2627 0.3122 0.3337 0.1577 0.2556 0.3399 0.3528
95
3.7 C onclusion
This chapter tests whether switching to the IFRS as a firm’s financial re­
porting regime is associated with a reduction in the cost of equity. Prior 
theoretical and empirical research affirms that more forthcoming disclosure 
reduces non-diversifiable estimation risk, by increasing the precision with 
which firm specific risk-return parameters are estimated. If future cash flows 
are a function of the transparency of firms in the present, then the ability to 
make more confident predictions should reduce the expected return. Bearing 
this in mind, coupled with the widespread consensus that the IFRS are in­
deed superior to most countries’ domestic standards; then the IFRS should, 
at least in theory, reduce the cost of equity.
Unfortunately, much ambivalence surrounds the measurement of an ex 
ante cost of equity, rendering the identification of an appropriate yardstick, 
almost impossible. To address this, two ex ante cost of equity measures 
are adopted here, with the effect of IFRS adoption examined pre vs post 
adoption, and in the context of early adopters, against a comparison group 
of non-adopters.
While some evidence is revealed that the cost of equity is reduced by IFRS 
adoption alone, these results are not consistent across all specifications. In 
particular, the Pastor et al. (2008) measure is negative and significant on 
the pre-post dummy variable D, indicating a reduction in the cost of equity, 
while the Easton (2004) measure is insignificant. Although correlated, this 
illustrates the error by which the cost of equity is measured. As mentioned, 
the absence of an appropriately accurate such measure at present, means
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that the cost of equity, at best, is measured with error. This is always a 
factor which must be borne in mind when interpreting the results of research 
drawing upon such measures. The greater theoretical rigour inherent in the 
Pastor et al. (2008) measure however, coupled with the more intuitive results 
using this measure in this chapter, leads to the conclusion that Pastor et al. 
(2008) is potentially the more robust of the two measures, given the context 
of this research. With this measure in mind, inclusion of slope dummy terms 
however, reveal that the abnormal cost of equity is lower in the post IFRS 
period for early adopting firms with greater analyst following than before 
adoption. Interestingly, across both early and official adoptors, this same 
variable is positive and only weakly significant. Hence, it is possible that early 
adoption has its merits, particularly for firms exhibiting greater visibility 
afforded by higher analyst following.
Global examination of the cost of equity, amid differences in regulatory 
frameworks, presents an exciting and fruitful area of enquiry. Whilst this 
chapter examines the role of a global set of accounting standards and the 
perceived transparency thereof, future research could test the effect using dif­
ferent asset pricing models specifically geared towards international enquiry 
using both ex ante and ex post measures. At this stage, the greatest chal­
lenge facing researchers is the lack of consensus surrounding an appropriate 
ex ante yardstick. Until major steps are taken to create a more parsimonious 
ex ante cost of equity model, it is likely that inconsistency in results will 
dominate empirical research in this area.
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C h ap te r  4
In te rn a tio n a l A ccounting  
S tan d ard s  an d  S tock V olatility
4.1 Introduction
This paper tests whether the switch to International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), results in a decrease in return volatility following adop­
tion. A simple cross sectional volatility model based on the Market Model, 
a measure of return volatility is observed surrounding the first earnings an­
nouncement following the first fiscal year of IFRS reporting. The model is 
intuitive, being derived from first principles from the Capital Asset Pric­
ing Model (CAPM), providing an alternative to extant ad hoc specifications 
throughout the literature.
The notion that the IFRS have the potential to affect return volatility 
stems from its association with information asymmetry. Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) state that there is a reasonably unanimous theoretical link associating 
a reduction in information asymmetry with a lower cost of equity.
Information asymmetries create costs by inducing adverse selec-
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tion into transactions between buyers and sellers of firm shares. In 
real institutional settings, adverse selection is typically manifest 
in reduced levels of liquidity for firm shares (e.g. Copeland and 
Galai (1983), Kyle (1985), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). To 
overcome the reluctance of potential investors to hold firm shares 
in illiquid markets, firms must issue capital at a discount. Dis­
counting results in fewer proceeds to the firm and hence higher 
costs of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000, p.92).
Hence, it seems reasonable to expect that means to reduce adverse se­
lection, namely increasing public disclosure, has the potential to improve 
demand for a firm’s stock, and hence mitigate any discount at issuance. Ar­
guing that share price volatility is a proxy for information asymmetry, Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000) test whether IFRS adoption in Germany is associated 
with any change in stock volatility, yet fail to reject the null. More generally, 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) find a positive (albeit weak) positive association 
between disclosure levels and stock volatility. Hence despite the theoretical 
intuition, empirical evidence tends to support the contention that an increase 
in disclosure actually increases stock volatility. Nevertheless, the paucity of 
empirical research addressing this link, and weak results thus far, leaves the 
question far from resolved.
Research addressing the effect of ‘information events’ on stock volatil­
ity, is even more scarce. Bailey et al. (2003), however, do examine stock 
volatility surrounding the imposition of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
in the United States (US) in October 2000. Reg FD essentially prohibited
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selective disclosure of what is, in effect private information, to certain mar­
ket participants such as analysts. Arguably, the subsequent trading on such 
information by its recipients, induces an increase in volatility of the asso­
ciated stock. Therefore, a decrease in the proportion of private to public 
information surrounding a firm, should reduce stock volatility (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988).
It is believed that a commitment to providing a greater level of disclo­
sure by a firm, should reduce information asymmetries (Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000). Indeed there is a broad body of literature examining the association 
between corporate disclosure and proxies for information asymmetry, such 
as the bid-ask spread (Welker, 1995), trading volume, and stock volatility 
(Bushee and Noe, 2000). Despite the strong theoretical arguments support­
ing a negative association between disclosure and information asymmetry, 
empirical results to date, reveal mixed findings.
Volatility in particular, is cited as being driven by the magnitude of peri­
odic surprises, and the price impact of trades (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Healy 
et ah, 1999). In the former case, greater transparency, by virtue of more 
public disclosure, should improve the predictability of earnings and hence 
smoother stock returns. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) suggest that greater 
public disclosure has an increasing effect on liquidity, which consequently 
reduces the price impact of trades. Therefore, in the event that public dis­
closure reduces the price impact of large trades, the information content 
revealed by trade should be lower, having a negative effect on volatility.
Bushee and Noe (2000) however, note that such a prediction depends
100
largely on the clientele for a firm’s stock, further suggesting that a greater 
number of transient investors gives rise to greater volatility following an in­
crease in public disclosure. They identify three types of institutional investors 
with transient and long-term indexers at the extremes, and find that there is 
no net effect of an increase in public disclosure on stock volatility. Examin­
ing transient investors however, being highly dependent on public sources of 
information, trade aggressively on public information signals, while ‘quasi- 
indexers’ are essentially unaffected.
This chapter proceeds by testing the notion that the switch to global 
financial reporting standards, cited as promoting transparency, in several 
ways. Firstly, using the developed model of cross sectional volatility, and the 
inclusion of a post-IFRS dummy variable, tests are performed over the short­
term and long-term. It is predicted, consistent with Bushee and Noe (2000) 
that transient investors will trade aggressively following the IFRS report 
date; resulting in an increase in volatility over this time frame. In the long 
term however, it is predicted that stock return volatility will decrease, due 
to an increase in transparency. This latter point is dependent on the country 
level information environment prior to adoption. This issue is addressed by 
including a pre-IFRS disclosure index, and fixed effects model robustness 
checks. Results reveal that across the entire sample of adopters, the null 
of no decrease in stock volatility in the 10 months following adoption, is 
rejected. Short term tests are less convincing, with all but one specification 
failing to reject the null. This provides some evidence that the behaviour 
of stock volatility following this information event differs, between the short
101
and long term.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the measure of 
cross sectional stock volatility used in this paper. Sections 3 and 4 specify 
the empirical model and data respectively. Section 5 details the results, and 
section 6 concludes.
4.2 A Simple M odel of Cross Sectional Volatil­
ity
To develop the cross sectional volatility model used here, the market model 
is used as a starting point, positing a linear relationship between returns for 
firm i and market returns:
R i t  — + ß iR m t  + eit (4-1)
Which, upon taking the variance, and setting the intercept equal to zero 
as implied by the CAPM, results in the following model:
Var(Rit) = ß2Var(Rrnt) + Var(eit) (4.2)
Three variables hence emerge as determinants of Var(Rit) through this 
decomposition; ß?, Var(Rmt), and Var^eu), being the squared measure of 
systematic risk (/?), the variance of the market, and the variance of unsys-
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tematic risk. Allowing each to enter as independent variables, results in the 
following:
Var(Rü) = ßißl + ß2Var(Rmt) + ß3Var(eit) (4.3)
To allow for a more intuitive interpretation of the variable ß, one may 
take the square root of Equation (4.2), resulting in the following general, 
cross sectional volatility model:
SD(Rit) = a +  ß\ßi + ß2SD{Rmt) + ß3SD{en) + rjn (4-4)
Where:
SD(Rit) = The backward standard deviation of returns for firm i at time 
t
ßi = The ßi of firm i
SD(Rmt) — The backward standard deviation of returns for the market 
m at time t
SD(eit) = The backward standard deviation of abnormal returns for 
firm i at time t 
r]it = The error term.
4.3 E m p irica l M o d e l
The empirical model is equivalent to Equation (4.4), albeit modified to exam­
ine the event under investigation. Bailey et al. (2003) provide an experimen-
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tal design which examines volatility surrounding Regulation FD through the 
inclusion of a pre-post dummy variable. Hence in addition to the variables 
implied by Equation (4.4), a dummy variable is included which assumes a 
value of 1 in the post adoption period, and 0 in the pre adoption period. 
With the inclusion of D, the empirical model becomes:1
SD(Rit) — c* + ß\SD(Rmt) +  /?2-SETAit 4- ßsDu +  ezt (4-5)
Where:
SD(Rit) = The backward standard deviation of returns for firm i at time 
t
BETA,i = 
SD(Rmt) =
D =
t i t
The ßi of firm i
The backward standard deviation of returns for the market 
m at time t
A dummy variable assuming a value of 0 in the pre IFRS 
period, and 1 in the post period.
The error term.
4.3 .1  S elf S election  B ias
Originating with Heckman (1979), the notion of self-selection may be viewed 
as giving rise to an omitted variable problem. Li and Prabhala (2007) illus-
lrThe term SD(eit) is omitted in the empirical model, as it is, by definition, the residual 
volatility. Inclusion of which, would result in a model regressing volatility on volatility, 
which mitigates meaningful inferences.
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träte this as follows. Assume that the following regression requires estima­
tion:
Yi — Xiß  +  6i (4-6)
Assume now, that a sub-sample of firms self selects into choice E. For this 
sub-sample of firms, the applicable regression equation becomes:
Yi\E = Xiß + ei\E (4.7)
As the self-selected sub sample is not random, failure to account for self­
selection results in inconsistent ß estimators. In correcting for self selection 
bias, the first step requires identification of factors likely to explain the de­
cision to self-select. I.e:
E = Wi = Ztf  + rji> 0 (4.8)
Where Wi is the selection variable, typically a dichotomous variable de­
noted as 1 for selection, and 0 otherwise. Zi is a vector of public exogenous 
variables, 7 is a vector of coefficients, and rji is an error term orthogonal to 
7 . It therefore implies that the equivalent expression for non-selection, NE,  
is as follows:
N E  = W{ = Zij  + rji < 0 (4-9)
Therefore, to estimate Equation 4.6 in the presence of self selection, and 
taking its expectation, and substituting in 4.8, the expression becomes:
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Yi\E — Xiß  +  (e^Ztf +  rji > 0)
X iß  + 7r(ci\Zi^ + r]i > 0) + V{ (4.10)
The expression in Equation (4.10) follows from the notion that e^ rj* = 
+  Ui, a regression of e* on rji, where 7r is therefore the coefficient, and Vi 
is the orthogonal error term. An equivalent expression for firms which do 
not self select into the choice under investigation may similarly be derived, 
by substituting Equation (4.9) into Equation (4.6). Taking expectations, 
and denoting the second term in Equation (4.10) as Ac^Z^), Li and Prab- 
hala (2007) present the following expression, which captures the essence of 
Heckman (1979):
Where n is the coefficient on the inverse mills ratio, and C denotes the 
choice to self select, or otherwise, by the firm. Examination of Equation 
(4.11) clearly reveals the omitted variable problem. Estimation of Equation 
(4.6) omits the final term in Equation (4.11), which arises due to a subset of 
firms self selecting into a given choice. Voluntary adoption into a particular 
disclosure regime, or in this case, early adoption, provides a classic example 
of the self selection problem. Therefore, a 2-step Heckman estimation to 
account for potential self selection bias requires, in addition to a vector of 
explanatory variables Xi, but also a vector Z* of public variables which,
E(Yi\C) = X iß + n \ c (Za) (4.11)
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according to theory, are expected to predict the self selection decision. The 
following section elaborates the choice of Z* as applicable to this paper; firm 
specific variables associated with early IFRS adoption.
Early adoption: P rob it m od el to  account for self-selection
Much of the literature in accounting suggests systematic characteristics of 
firms which essentially opt in, or voluntarily provide financial disclosure above 
a minimum requirement. For example, Healy et al. (1999) finds that firms 
that intend on raising external capital within the United States provide ad­
ditional voluntary disclosure prior to the issuance. Further, firms which have 
higher visibility are more inclined to provide voluntary disclosure. For ex­
ample, large firms tend to be more transparent (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1993), as do firms which are cross-listed (Lang et al. 
2003).
International evidence tends to reveal similar results at the global level, 
albeit with external dependence emerging as a consistently important fac­
tor. Ashbaugh (2001) for instance, finds that the choice to voluntarily report 
under either the international accounting standards (IAS) or United States 
(US) Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), by non-US firms 
is associated with the number of foreign listings, the existence of a forthcom­
ing stock issuance, and the transparency afforded by the extant domestic 
standards. Furthermore, Dumontier and Raffournier (1998), El-Gazzar et 
al. (1999), Murphy (1999), and Cuijpers and Buijink (2005), all find that 
the dispersion of foreign operations is highly associated with the decision to
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adopt non-local GAAP, in accord with the notion that such firms exhibit 
heterogeneity in their stakeholder base.
Prior empirical literature specifically examining the decision to voluntar­
ily opt into the IFRS regime, follows the above. Hung and Subramanyam 
(2007), in examining the shift of German firms to the IFRS, control for po­
tential self-selection bias by running a probit regression of the decision to 
voluntarily adopt, on return on assets, leverage, size, cross listing, increase 
in common stock, increase in long term debt, and industry and year dum­
mies. Consistent with the prior studies, the size coefficient is positive and 
highly significant. Based on the visibility and foreign dependence arguments, 
the following first-stage regression is specified:
Ci = ßo + ßi L N S IZ E u  + faEPSa + foFSALESa  (4.12)
+ßAL IS T IN G S it + ßbN U M E STit +  ß6DISCLOSEi  
+ß7CORRUPTl + eit
Where:
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Ci =
L N  S I  Z  Eit = 
EP  Sü = 
FSALESu  =
A dichotomous variable assuming a value of 1 if the firm is a 
voluntary adopter, or 0 otherwise.
The natural log of size for i at time t 
Earnings per share for firm i at time t
Foreign sales as a proportion of total sales for firm i at time
t
LISTINGSit  = 
NUMESTu  = 
DISCLOSEi = 
C O R R U P T =
The number of foreign listings for firm i at time t 
The number of analysts following firm i at time t 
Local GAAP based disclosure/transparency score for firm i 
a corruption index score, as per La Porta et al. (1998).
Time t denotes the time of the switch to the IFRS, or more specifically, 
the most recent data prior to adoption.
A second stage Heckman model is now specified, which is identical to 
Equation (4.5), albeit now with the inclusion of Heckman’s Lambda. Hence, 
the second stage model is:
SD(Rit) — a + ßiSD(Rrnt) + ß2BETAit + ßsDit + ß^LAMBDAit + ea (4.13)
Where:
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SD(Rit) =  The backward standard deviation of returns for firm i at time 
t
BETAi = 
SD(Rmt) =
D =
LA M B D A  =
€it
4.4 D a ta
The ßi of firm i
The backward standard deviation of returns for the market 
m at time t
A dummy variable assuming a value of 0 in the pre IFRS 
period, and 1 in the post period 
Heckman’s Lambda.
The error term.
Thompson Financial Worldscope provides annual data regarding the stan­
dards adopted by firms, at the global level. Identification of of the first IFRS 
earnings announcement involves firstly identifying the first fiscal year end 
where IFRS is stated as the applied standards. If the reported standards at t 
are the IFRS, and domestic standards are applied in year t — 1, then year t is 
identified as the switch year. The month of the first earnings announcement 
following the IFRS switch year end, also obtained from Worldscope, is month 
t = 0 for the purpose of this research. The window of inclusion is 1998-2008, 
following the move towards improvement in the quality of the IFRS from 
1998, when IOSCO indicated the desire to endorse the global standards. 
Given this time frame, the number of firms for which standards adoption 
data is available is 18761. Of these, a total of 5856 firms are identified as
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IFRS adopters, with 571 of which, being early adopters.2
Returns data necessary for the volatility measures are obtained from 
Datastream, with firm daily returns in particular, calculated from Datas- 
tream’s total return index. Further, market indices for each country are also 
also obtained from Datastream, facilitating the calculation of the market 
level volatility for each country. Volatility is calculated for each month, as 
the backwards standard deviation of total returns over the 20 trading days 
prior to the beginning of each month. Given this requirement, the post-IFRS 
observations begin from t + 2, with the t + 1 returns being used to calcu­
late SD(Rit) and SD(Rirn) for t + 2, and the returns of each subsequent 
month used as the basis for the volatility measured at each following month 
thereafter. B E T A  is based on estimation of the market model:
Rit — Oti + ßiRmt + eit (4.14)
B E T A  is estimated separately over the 250 days pre and 250 days post 
IFRS adoption, hence each firm has a separate pre and post IFRS B E T A  
observation. Additionally, to be included in the sample, an adopting firm 
must have 10 months of data both pre and post IFRS. Bushee and Noe 
(2000) find that higher disclosure is associated with lower subsequent stock 
return volatility, however other research concludes the opposite result (Lang 
and Lundholm, 1993; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). The latter results are
2 An early adopter is a firm which adopts the IFRS prior to a country level re­
quirement to do so. Details on country IFRS adoption requirements are provided by 
http://www.iasplus.com (Deloitte).
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attributed to aggressive trading on the information inherent in greater dis­
closure, with Bushee and Noe (2000) in particular, finding that firms known 
for greater transparency, attract transient investors which trade aggressively 
on earnings releases. It is therefore expected that in such an event, the 
association between greater transparency, by way of IFRS adoption, has a 
differential effect in the short and long term. To capture these differences, in 
addition to the 10 month pre-post data requirement (long-term effect), a set 
of 3 month pre-post IFRS adoption tests are also conducted. The 10-month 
pre-post final sample is 27914 firm month observations (13957 pre and 13957 
post IFRS).
4.5 R e su lts
The results of the aforementioned empirical models are examined in this 
section. Firstly, descriptive statistics both pre and post IFRS adoption of 
the variables under consideration, are presented. Estimation of Equations 
(4.4) and (4.13), and variations thereof, follow.
As a matter of exposition, the time series behaviour of volatility sur­
rounding the first instance of IFRS earnings, is presented in Figures 4.1 and 
4.2. Figure 4.1, in which the horizontal axis is the mean backward standard 
deviation of returns over 20 trading days across the entire sample, reveals an 
increase in volatility subsequent to t = 0.3 This diagram reveals a striking
3It is important to consider the effect of a backward 20-day window used to calculate 
each daily measure of volatility. Each day from t — 0 to t — 20, will incorporate the effect 
of returns prior to t = 0, as reflected by the the gradual increase in volatility between
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change in the behaviour of stock volatility following t — 0.
Recall the inconclusive state of the literature regarding the precise direc­
tional association between disclosure and stock volatility. Although trans­
parency should decrease volatility, according to theory, prior research by 
Bushee and Noe (2000) for example, suggests that disclosure increases due 
to transient investors trading aggressively on such information. It may there­
fore be the case that the the association may differ between the short and 
long term. In the short term, following the release of accounting information, 
transient investors reliant on such information, may indeed trade aggressively. 
However, in the presence of market efficiency, one would assume that in the 
long term, not only would any perceived mispricing be arbitraged away; those 
capable of unique interpretation of such reports (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), 
would be long gone. As such, the empirical specifications within this chap­
ter are tested over 3-months and 10-months pre and post the IFRS earnings 
release, to capture the short and long run effects respectively.
4.5 .1  D escrip tive  S ta tistics
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics by country. Firm stock return volatil­
ity (S D R I ) (market volatility (S D R M )) range from 0.2355 (0.1108) for 
Spain, to 0.5517 (0.3368) for China. Given that daily return data is used 
to calculate B E T A , Scholes and Williams (1977) B E T A  values are reported 
for robustness. B E T A  ranges in value, from 0.4979 for the sample of Bel­
gian firms, to 1.1259 for the Czech Republic. With the exception of the latter 
t = 0 and t = 20
113
SD of returns
0.157
0 156
0.155
0.154
0 153
0.152
0.151
0 150
0.149
0 148
0.147
0.146
0 145
0,144
0.143
0 142
0.141
0.140 :
Day relative to IFRS
earnings
Figure 4.1 -  Return volatility surrounding IFRS report date
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Figure 4.2 -  Abnormal return volatility surrounding IFRS report date
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country, all mean values of B E T A  are below 1, indicating that the sample of 
firms, at the country level, are less risky than their respective markets. Sc- 
holes and Williams (1977) BETAs  are quantitatively similar to unadjusted 
B E T A  values, but are generally slightly higher, indicating a small degree of 
downward bias as suggested by Scholes and Williams (1977).
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Table 4.2 contains descriptive statistics pre, and post IFRS respectively. 
The most salient of results here, is the greater volatility stated for the post- 
IFRS period (0.3149, vs 0.3073 pre-IFRS). However, this appears to be con­
sistent with the mean market volatility difference between the two periods. 
Examination of B E T A  provides some evidence that relative to the market, 
the sample of IFRS adopters show an increase in volatility which is econom­
ically significant (from 0.5991 to 0.7058). Taken together, the descriptive 
statistics within Table 4.2, suggest greater volatility following IFRS adop­
tion.
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Table 4.3 provides cross correlations for the variables used in the analysis. 
As expected, B E T A  and B E T A S W  are highly correlated, and there appears 
to little concern regarding collinearity between the dependent variables.
Table 4.3 -  Summary of cross-correlations: pre vs post IFRS
S D R I  is the  volatility  of of firm i, calculated as th e  backw ards s tan d ard  deviation  over th e  prior 20 trad ing  
days, S D R M  is th e  volatility  of th e  m arket of firm i, calculated  over th e  prior 20 trad in g  days, R I  and 
R M  are re tu rn s for firm i, and th e  m arket respectively, B E T A  is a  separa te  pre and post IFR S ß  for firm 
i, calculated  using th e  m arket m odel over th e  250 trad in g  prior to , and post th e  first IFR S announcem ent 
day, and B E T  A S W  are Scholes and W illiam s (1977) corrected  Betas.
Variable SDRI SDRM RI RM BETA BETA SW
Pre-IFR S  (n =  14270)
SDRI 1 0.344 0.072 -0.051 0.1 0.1123
SDRM 0.344 1 -0.0506 -0.1418 0.0001 -0.0379
RI 0.072 -0.0506 1 0.1749 0.0639 0.0617
RM -0.051 -0.1418 0.1749 1 -0.0115 -0.0043
BETA 0.1 0.0001 0.0639 -0.0115 1 0.7972
B ETA SW 0.1123 -0.0379 0.0617 -0.0043 0.7972 1
Post-IFR S (n=14270)
SDRI 1 0.3717 0.0287 0.0322 0.1482 0.1112
SDRM 0.3717 1 -0.0267 -0.0141 0.0155 -0.0318
RI 0.0287 -0.0267 1 0.2413 0.0134 0.0124
RM 0.0322 -0.0141 0.2413 1 0.0025 -0.0136
BETA 0.1482 0.0155 0.0134 0.0025 1 0.7853
B ETA SW 0.1112 -0.0318 0.0124 -0.0136 0.7853 1
4 .5 .2  R egression  R esu lts
Table 4.4 reports the results of estimation of Equation (4.4)4, with the in­
clusion of slope dummies to isolate any post IFRS effect. T-statistics are in
4Like Bailey et al. (2003), size, dispersion in analyst forecasts, and analyst forecast 
error, were also included as independent variables (untabulated). Inclusion of these vari­
ables added little to the inferences drawn, and in the case of analyst forecast variables, 
reduced the sample size substantially. As a result, these variables were dropped from 
further analysis.
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parentheses below the parameter estimates, and are based on clustered stan­
dard errors, clustered on country and firm. Model (1) is the Equation (4.4) 
specification, which includes two country level variables, DISCLOSURE  
and CORRUPT , to control for the pre-IFRS reporting environment. Spec­
ifications (2)-(4) are fixed effects models, with fixed effects on country (2), 
year (3) and both country and year (4).
For all results, the first column includes two country level variables, 
DISCLOSURE  and CORRUPT , which are to control for the pre-IFRS 
reporting environment, and the remaining three are country, year, and both 
country and year fixed effects models. Consistent with the devised cross- 
sectional model, market volatility S D R M  and B E T A , are positive and 
highly significant across all specifications. Inclusion of the E A R L Y  dummy 
variable is to no avail, being insignificant. D however, the variable of interest, 
is negative and highly significant across all specifications. Hence, given the 
model specified, the null of no effect on volatility post-IFRS, is rejected. The 
three slope dummies, included to isolate post-IFRS effects given the inde­
pendent variables, reveal that for specifications (1) and (2), the association 
between SD R M  and S D R I  is higher in the post period.
Table 4.5 estimates identical models, albeit over the 3 months either side 
of the IFRS reporting date. As with the 10 month tests, the variables SD R M  
and B E T A  are positive and significant. E A R L Y  is positive and significant 
for specification (2), suggesting that early adopters experience an increase 
in volatility during the 3 months following the IFRS report date, which ac­
counting for country fixed effects. D ) which reflects the post IFRS increase
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Table 4.4 -  Results: 10-months pre-post earnings announcement regression
R esults of estim ating  the  following regression model:
S D R n  =  e*o +  a iS D R m t  +  oczBetai -f a ^ D n  -f a ^S D R m t  * Dit
+ac,Betai * Z?t 4- ciqD I  S C  L O S  E{ +  a jC O R R U  PT{ +  c*
S D R n  is th e  volatility  of of firm i, calculated as th e  backw ards s tan d ard  deviation  over th e  prior 20 trad ing  
days, SD R m t  is th e  volatility  of th e  m arket of firm i, calculated  over the  prior 20 trad in g  days, Betai  is a 
separa te  pre and post IFR S ß  for firm i, calculated using th e  m arket m odel over th e  250 trad in g  prior to, 
and  post th e  first IFR S announcem ent day, and D  is a  dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 0 in th e  pre 
IFR S period, and 1 in th e  post period. D IS C L O S U R E  is a  country  level disclosure score as per CIFAR 
(1995), and  C O R R U P T  is a  corrup tion  index score as used by La P o rta  e t al. (1998). Specification (1) 
controls for country  differences th rough  the  inclusion of D IS C L O S U R E  and  C O R R U P T ,  while (2)-(4) 
are country, year, and country-year fixed effects m odels respectively. T -sta tis tic s  are reported  below the 
coefficient estim ates in parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and au tocorrela tion  in the  
residuals.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
IN T E R C E P T 0.1965 0.1325 0.1968 0.1296
(1.51) (18.25) (8.40) (9.08)
SDRM 0.7106 0.6856 0.7806 0.6779
(10.04) (18.72) (11.53) (15.01)
BETA 0.0446 0.0437 0.0487 0.0449
(3.67) (3.81) (3.78) (4.31)
EARLY 0.0125 0.0071 -0.0046 -0.0110
(0.80) (0.95) (-0.19) (-0.93)
D -0.0465 -0.0392 -0.0518 -0.0391
(-4.90) (-3.80) (-5.03) (-3.16)
SDRM *D 0.1826 0.1531 0.0821 0.1243
(2.87) (2.01) (1.24) (1.60)
BETA*D 0.0182 0.0141 0.0135 0.0111
(1.67) (1.44) (1.44) (1.42)
EARLY*D -0.0048 -0.0228 0.0073 -0.0144
DISCLO SURE
C O R R U PT
(-0.53)
-0.0008
(-0.38)
0.0053
(0.47)
(-1.72) (0.62) (-1.25)
O bservations 27058 27914 27914 27914
R 2 0.1029 0.1930 0.1515 0.1960
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across the entire sample, is negative and highly significant in specification 
(1), and insignificant across (2)-(3). B E T A  * D is now positive and signif­
icant, suggesting that B E T A  is higher in the 3 month post IFRS period. 
Finally, early adopters experience greater volatility in specification (1) only. 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7, which substitute the Scholes and Williams (1977) adjusted 
beta, B E T A S W , are quantitatively similar to Tables 4.4 and 4.5, with the 
exception that E A R L Y  * D in the 3 month regression, is now insignificant.
Results of the probit model required for self selection correction are pre­
sented in 4.8. The E P S  variable is positive and significant, indicating that 
better performing firms seem to exhibit a greater probability of early adop­
tion. Further, the percentage of foreign sales, FSALES, is also positive and 
significant. As a proxy for international dependence, the notion that firms 
with greater reliance on foreign sales adopt the IFRS early, is not surpris­
ing. The negative and significant result on A N A L Y S T S  suggests that firms 
with greater analyst coverage, may indeed be highly visible and transparent, 
and see no benefit of early adoption. Finally the positive and significant 
result on D ISC LO SU R E , while potentially at odds with the information 
environment argument for A N A L Y  ST  S , is potentially due to less reluctance 
of firms within countries affording greater disclosure already, to early adopt 
into the IFRS, likely due to the relatively low cost of doing so.
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 present the self-selection corrected results across 8 
specifications, examining 10 and 3 months either side of the IFRS report date 
repsectively. Specifications (l)-(4) are identical to those previously, except
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Table 4.5 -  Results: 3-months pre-post earnings announcement regression
R esults of estim ating  th e  following regression model:
S D R n  — ao + ociSDRmt + &2Betcii + a^Dit + a4SD R m t * Du
-\-a5Betai * Dt +  a ^ D IS C L O S E i  +  ocjCORRUPTi  +  tj
S D R n  is th e  volatility  of of firm i, calculated as th e  backwards s tan d ard  deviation  over the  prior 20 trad ing  
days, SD R m t  is the  volatility  of th e  m arket of firm i, calculated  over th e  prior 20 trad ing  days, Betai is a 
separate  pre and post IFR S ß  for firm i, calculated  using th e  m arket m odel over th e  250 trad in g  prior to, 
and post the  first IFR S announcem ent day, and D  is a  dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 0 in the pre 
IFR S period, and 1 in the  post period. D IS C L O S U R E  is a  country  level disclosure score as per CIFAR 
(1995), and C O R R U P T  is a corruption  index score as used by La P o rta  e t al. (1998). Specification (1) 
controls for country  differences th rough  the  inclusion of D IS C L O S U R E  and C O R R U P T ,  while (2)-(4) 
are country, year, and  country-year fixed effects models respectively. T -sta tis tic s  are reported  below the  
coefficient estim ates in parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and au tocorrela tion  in th e  
residuals.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
IN T E R C E P T 0.1614 0.1595 0.1800 0.1519
(1.71) (7.71) (4.71) (6.20)
SDRM 0.5922 0.6722 0.8134 0.6478
(4.85) (4.78) (4.91) (5.37)
BETA 0.0481 0.0533 0.0525 0.0551
(4.35) (4.35) (3.48) (4.15)
EARLY 0.0164 0.0239 -0.0035 0.0064
(1.31) (2.52) (-0.08) (0.34)
D -0.2533 -0.0381 -0.0299 -0.0354
(-8.29) (-1.31) (-1.03) (-1.18)
SDRM*D 0.1826 0.1013 -0.0228 0.1070
(1.08) (0.51) (-0.13) (0.59)
BETA*D 0.0304 0.0428 0.0425 0.0389
(1.96) (2.90) (2.59) (2.47)
EARLY*D 0.6331 -0.0174 -0.0044 -0.0286
D ISCLO SURE
C O R R U PT
(13.52)
-0.0001
(-0.08)
0.0059
(0.61)
(-1.01) (-0.34) (-1.80)
O bservations 10187 10509 10509 10509
R 2 0.2811 0.2291 0.1782 0.2339
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Table 4.6 -  Results: 10-months pre-post earnings announcement regression (Scholes 
and Williams (1977) Betas)
R esults of estim ating  th e  following regression model:
SDRit — ao +  a iS D R m t +  &2Betai +  a^Dit +  a4SDRmt * Da
-\-a5 Betai * Dt +  ocqD  I  S C  L O SE i orjCORRU PT{ -(- ej
S D R u  is th e  volatility  of of firm i, calculated  as th e  backw ards stan d ard  deviation over th e  prior 20 trad ing  
days, SD R m t is th e  volatility  of the  m arket of firm i, calculated  over th e  prior 20 trad in g  days, Betat is a 
separa te  pre and post IFR S ß for firm i, calculated  using th e  m arket model over th e  250 trad in g  prior to, 
and post th e  first IFR S announcem ent day, and D is a  dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 0 in th e  pre 
IFR S period, and 1 in the  post period. D IS C L O S U R E  is a  country  level disclosure score as per CIFA R 
(1995), and  C O R R U P T  is a  corrup tion  index score as used by La P o rta  e t al. (1998). Specification (1) 
controls for country  differences th rough  the  inclusion of D IS C L O S U R E  and C O R R U  P T , while (2)-(4) 
are country, year, and country-year fixed effects m odels respectively. T -sta tis tic s  are reported  below the  
coefficient estim ates in parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and au tocorrela tion  in th e  
residuals.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
IN T E R C E P T 0.2046 0.1235 0.1861 0.1201
(1.37) (18.93) (10.62) (10.75)
SDRM 0.7175 0.6806 0.7852 0.6711
(10.34) (18.64) (11.80) (14.64)
BETASW 0.0496 0.0507 0.0528 0.0513
(4.22) (4.74) (5.21) (4.93)
EARLY 0.0134 0.0088 -0.0041 -0.0109
(0.81) (1.21) (-0.17) (-0.88)
D -0.0346 -0.0324 -0.0394 -0.0332
(-6.24) (-3.99) (-4.48) (-3.49)
SDRM*D 0.1917 0.1657 0.0923 0.1353
(2.84) (2.11) (1.35) (1.67)
BETASW *D 0.0027 0.0051 -0.0004 0.0039
(0.41) (0.87) (-0.06) (0.78)
EARLY*D -0.0102 -0.0265 0.0026 -0.0174
DISCLO SURE
C O R R U PT
(-1.07)
-0.0010
(-0.47)
0.0053
(0.46)
(-1.90) (0.19) (-1.44)
O bservations 27058 27914 27914 27914
R 2 0.1039 0.1969 0.1525 0.2002
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Table 4.7 -  Results: 3-months pre-post earnings announcement regression (Scholes 
and Williams (1977) Betas)
R esults of estim ating  the  following regression model:
S D R u  =  a o a i S D R m t  + &2Betai + a^D it + a4SDR.Tnt * Dit 
* Dt +  a ^D IS C L O S E i  -f- a^C O R R U P Ti  +  €j
S D R u  is th e  volatility  of of firm i, calculated  as th e  backwards s tan d ard  deviation over th e  prior 20 trad ing  
days, SD R m t  is th e  volatility  of the  m arket of firm i, calculated  over th e  prior 20 trad in g  days, Betai is a 
sep ara te  pre and post IFR S ß  for firm i, calculated  using th e  m arket model over th e  250 trad in g  prior to, 
and  post th e  first IFR S announcem ent day, and D  is a  dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 0 in th e  pre 
IFR S period, and 1 in th e  post period. D IS C L O S U R E  is a  coun try  level disclosure score as per CIFA R 
(1995), and C O R R U P T  is a  corrup tion  index score as used by L a P o rta  e t al. (1998). Specification (1) 
controls for country  differences th rough  th e  inclusion of D IS C L O S U  R E  and C O R R U  P T , while (2)-(4) 
are  country, year, and country-year fixed effects models respectively. T -sta tistic s are  reported  below the  
coefficient estim ates in parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and au tocorrela tion  in the 
residuals.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
IN T E R C E P T 0.1372 0.1506 0.1622 0.1381
(0.82) (8.67) (4.56) (6.13)
SDRM 0.5205 0,6561 0.8174 0.6287
(4.65) (4.73) (4.92) (5.22)
BETASW 0.0599 0.0611 0.0617 0.0622
(5.50) (5.80) (5.61) (5.79)
EARLY 0.0383 0.0250 -0.0051 0.0044
(2.01) (2.77) (-0.13) (0.24)
D -0.0586 -0.0338 -0.0215 -0.0312
(-3.93) (-1.30) (-0.85) (-1.18)
SDRM*D 0.3339 0.1308 0.0031 0.1328
(2.65) (0.65) (0.02) (0.70)
BETASW *D 0.0310 0.0320 0.0266 0.0296
(3.95) (4.67) (3.06) (3.74)
EARLY*D -0.0062 -0.0224 -0.0081 -0.0323
DISCLO SURE
C O R R U PT
(-0.70)
-0.0003
(-0.13)
0.0097
(0.69)
(-1.17) (-0.52) (-1.83)
O bservations 10187 10509 10509 10509
R? 0.1235 0.2348 0.1822 0.2399
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Table 4.8 -  Results: Probit model of determinants of early adoption
R esults of estim ating  th e  following prob it model:
Ci = ß0 + ß \ L N S I Z E it +  ß 2E P S it +  ß z F S A L E S u  +  ß4L I S T I N G S lt 
+ßbN U M E S T it +  ß eD IS C L O S E i  + ß 1C O R R U P T i +  eit
C  is a  dichotom ous variable assum ing a  value of 1 if the  firm  is an early adop ter, and 0 if th e  firm adopts a t 
th e  official country  level adoption  da te , L N S I Z E  is th e  log of m arket cap italisation , E P S  is earnings per 
share  scaled by price, F S A L E S  is th e  level of foreign sales as a percentage of to ta l sales, A N A L Y S T S  
is th e  num ber of analysts following th e  firm, L I S T I N G S  is th e  num ber of foreign exchange listings, 
D IS C L O S U R E  is a  country  level disclosure score as per CIFA R (1995), and C O R R U P T  is a  corruption  
index score as used by La P o rta  e t al. (1998). T -sta tistic s are reported  below th e  coefficient estim ates in 
parentheses, and are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and au tocorrela tion  in th e  residuals, w ith standards 
errors c lustered by country  and firm.
Variable
IN T E R C E P T -2.2064
(-1.92)
LNSIZE -0.0504
(-1.48)
E PS 0.1736
(3.11)
FSALES 0.0050
(5.37)
ANALYSTS -0.0533
(-5.14)
LISTINGS 0.0227
(0.39)
D ISCLO SURE 0.0392
(3.03)
C O R R U PT 0.0906
(0.55)
O bservations 2167
R-Square 0.1526
M ax-rescaled 0.2203
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the sample here, by its nature, includes only early adopters. Specifications 
(5)-(8) includes Heckman’s Lambda. Table 4.9 indicates that SD R M  and 
B E T A  are positive and significant as predicted. D is insignificant across all 
specifications. B E T A  * D, is negative and insignificant, providing evidence 
that IFRS adoption reduces B E T A  over the long term.5
Table 4.10 reveals positive and significant coefficients on SD R M  and 
B E T A , with the exception of SD R M  in (3) and (7). D is now insignificant 
across all specifications. Private information associated with early adoption, 
is only evidenced in (6) and (8), where the coefficients are negative and 
significant.
4.6 C onclu sion
This chapter tests whether the switch to the IFRS are associated with a re­
duction in stock return volatility following the first IFRS report date. As 
prior evidence is mixed regarding the directional association between disclo­
sure and volatility, it is postulated here that the association should be tested 
in a short-run and a long-run context, reflecting existing evidence that tran­
sient investors trade aggressively on the release of new information, which 
should stabilise over time. Further, theoretical work suggests that volatility 
is a reflection of information asymmetry, or at least information opaqueness. 
Given the involvement of transient investors in the short term, the effect
5Scholes and Williams (1977) BETA  tests provide near identical results, and for this 
reason, are untabulated here.
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Table 4.9 -  Results: Early adopters relative to matched official adopters - 10 months 
pre and post
R esults of estim ating  th e  following regression model:
SdRa =  ao +  QiSdRmt +  a^-Befaj +  a^Dn -I- Q4SdRmt * Du +  a^BETAt  * Dt 
+ a e S IZ E it +  qj  D I  SC  LO S E^  +  agCORRU PTi +  agL A M B D A i  +  ej
SdRa  is th e  volatility  of of firm i, calculated  as the  backw ards s tan d ard  deviation over th e  p rior 20 trad ing  
days, SdRmt  is the  volatility  of the  m arket of firm i, calculated  over th e  prior 20 trad in g  days, Betdi is a 
separa te  pre and post IFR S ß  for firm i, calculated using th e  m arket m odel over th e  250 trad in g  prior to, 
and post th e  first IFR S announcem ent day, and D is a dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 0 in the  pre 
IFR S period, and 1 in th e  post period. D ISC LO SU R E  is a country  level disclosure score as per CIFAR 
(1995), and C O R R U P T  is a  corruption  index score as used by La P o rta  et al. (1998)and L A M B D A  
is H eckm an’s Lam bda. Specifications (1) and (5) control for country  differences th rough  th e  inclusion 
of D ISC LO SU R E  and CORRU P T , while (2)-(4) and (6)-(8) are country, year, and  country-year fixed 
effects m odels respectively. T -sta tistics are reported  below th e  coefficient estim ates in parentheses, and 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and autocorrela tion  in th e  residuals, w ith stan d ard s errors clustered 
by country  and firm.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IN T E R C E P T
SDRM
BETA
D
SDRM *D
BETA*D
DISCLO SURE
C O R R U PT
LAMBDA
O bservations
R 2
0.2048 0.0435
(1.60) (1.60)
0.8103 0.8489
(12.44) (10.10)
0.1051 0.1030
(3.13) (3.07)
0.0232 -0.0018
(0.54) (-0.04)
0.0610 0.1147
(0.18) (0.34)
-0.0631 -0.0331
(-2.53) (-2.33)
-0.0027
(-1.56)
0.0086
(0.50)
600 600
0.3186 0.3328
0.1170 -0.0660
(3.91) (-2.04)
0.6807 0.7678
(5.32) (5.59)
0.1422 0.1463
(5.16) (7.19)
0.0594 0.0368
(1.08) (0.64)
0.1119 0.1269
(0.31) (0.35)
-0.1352 -0.1030
(-3.30) (-2.74)
600 600 
0.3674 0.3951
0.2460 0.0605
(2.05) (1.36)
0.8282 0.8585
(12.50) (11.16)
0.1172 0.1123
(2.08) (1.96)
0.0202 -0.0032
(0.51) (-0.08)
0.0843 0.1308
(0.28) (0.44)
-0.0636 -0.0347
(-2.46) (-2.08)
-0.0030
(-1.81)
0.0073
(0.47)
-0.0279 -0.0217
(-0.58) (-0.42)
600 600
0.3225 0.3351
0.0605 -0.0409
(1.36) (-0.74)
0.8585 0.7685
(11.16) (5.77)
0.1123 0.1551
(1.96) (6.14)
-0.0032 0.0362
(-0.08) (0.65)
0.1308 0.1234
(0.44) (0.35)
-0.0347 -0.1018
(-2.08) (-2.40)
-0.0217 -0.0461
(-0.42) (-1.02)
600 600
0.3351 0.4014
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Table 4.10 -  Results: Early adopters relative to matched official adopters - 3 months 
pre and post
R esults of estim ating  th e  following regression model:
SdRn  =  ao +  aiSdR m t +  a2Beta,i -f a^Da +  a^SdRmt * D a  +  oc^BETA{ * Dt 
+ a e S I  Z  Ea  +  ctjDISC LOSEi +  OC&CORRU PTi +  agL A M  B  DAi +  ej
S d R a  is th e  volatility  of of firm i, calculated  as th e  backw ards stan d ard  deviation over th e  prior 20 trad ing  
days, SdRmt  is th e  volatility  of th e  m arket of firm i, calculated  over the  prior 20 trad in g  days, Betai  is a 
separa te  pre and post IFR S ß  for firm i, calculated using th e  m arket m odel over th e  250 trad in g  prior to, 
and  post th e  first IFR S announcem ent day, and D is a dum m y variable assum ing a  value of 0 in the  pre 
IFR S period, and 1 in th e  post period. D IS C L O S U R E  is a country  level disclosure score as per CIFAR 
(1995), and  C O R R U P T  is a  corrup tion  index score as used by La P o rta  e t al. (1998)and L A M B D A  
is H eckm an’s Lam bda. Specifications (1) and (5) control for country  differences th rough  th e  inclusion 
of D IS C L O S U R E  and  C O R R U  P T ,  while (2)-(4) and (6)-(8) are country, year, and country-year fixed 
effects m odels respectively. T -sta tis tic s  are reported  below th e  coefficient estim ates in parentheses, and 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity  and au tocorrela tion  in th e  residuals, w ith  s tan d ard  errors c lustered by 
country  and  firm.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IN T E R C E P T
SDRM
BETA
D
SDRM *D
BETA*D
D ISCLO SU RE
C O R R U PT
LAM BDA
O bservations
R 2
0.7292 0.0734
(2.17) (1.50)
0.5397 0.5250
(4.67) (4.91)
0.1372 0.1237
(9.62) (5.28)
-0.0326 -0.0506
(-0.84) (-1.07)
0.5189 0.5150
(2.19) (2.15)
-0.0343 -0.0018
(-1.04) (-0.07)
-0.0061
(-1.60)
-0.0205
(-0.37)
414 414
0.2020 0.2607
0.2104 -0.0261
(2.82) (-0.34)
0.2109 0.3480
(1.18) (2.60)
0.1463 0.1311
(8.24) (5.88)
0.0142 -0.0039
(0.29) (-0.07)
0.2952 0.2949
(0.81) (0.78)
-0.0523 -0.0177
(-1.15) (-0.47)
414 414
0.3130 0.3548
0.7693 0.1110
(2.05) (2.88)
0.5379 0.5245
(4.65) (4.98)
0.1431 0.1331
(6.73) (4.49)
-0.0346 -0.0542
(-0.99) (-1.25)
0.5291 0.5302
(2.40) (2.37)
-0.0341 -0.0004
(-0.98) (-0.01)
-0.0066
(-1.68)
-0.0184
(-0.33)
-0.0195 -0.0318
(-0.85) (-2.09)
414 414
0.2041 0.2663
0.2371 0.0048
(3.93) (0.06)
0.2000 0.3486
(1.14) (2.76)
0.1511 0.1392
(7.07) (5.44)
0.0122 -0.0069
(0.26) (-0.13)
0.3038 0.3054
(0.87) (0.85)
-0.0512 -0.0152
(-1.03) (-0.35)
-0.0185 -0.0317
(-1.30) (-3.43)
414 414
0.3147 0.3595
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of greater transparency, should result in a decrease in volatility in the long 
term.
Results reveal that across the entire sample of adopters, the null of no 
decrease in stock volatility in the 10 months following adoption, is rejected. 
Short term tests are less convincing, with all but one specification failing 
to reject the null. This provides some evidence that the behaviour of stock 
volatility following this information event differs, between the short and long 
term. Furthermore, B E T  A is significantly positive in the post-IFRS period in 
3-month post tests. Hence, although raw volatility is insignificantly different 
in the post IFRS period in such tests, the positive and significant coefficient 
on the B E T A  slope dummy suggests that relative to the market, volatility 
is in fact, greater.
The association between information and stock return volatility poses a 
number of interesting research opportunities. For one, future research could 
further disentangle the short and long run properties of stock volatility, and 
its association with earnings releases, examining the effect of good vs bad 
news. The IFRS has only provided one information event. Indeed, future 
research may entail examining the effect of regulatory changes on volatility, 
or the interested researcher may also opt to apply a GARCH model to test 
the robustness of the results herein.
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C h a p te r  5
C onclusion
This dissertation tests the contention that the IFRS promote transparency, 
through three relevant factors; the adverse selection component of the bid- 
ask spread, the cost of equity, and stock return volatility. Each of these is 
addressed as a separate chapter, which together seek to provide evidence on 
the hypothesised effect on transparency.
The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, tests whether IFRS adoption 
is associated with a reduction in the adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread. The chapter begins by elaborating on a model by Bollen 
et al. (2004), which isolates the separate components of the bid-ask spread; 
order processing cost, inventory holding cost, and adverse selection cost. The 
adverse selection measure captures the extent to which the market maker 
hedges against the probability of an adverse price movement until the position 
is reversed out, and the risk of encountering an informed trader. If the IFRS 
succeed in improving transparency, consistent with prior literature, then the 
second point; the risk of encountering an informed trader, is reduced.
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Using a model due to Bollen et al. (2004) and adopting the approach 
taken by Sidhu et al. (2008), a dummy variable is added which assumes a 
value of 1 in the post-IFRS period, and 0 otherwise. Further, given that 
firms may early adopt into the regime, additional models are tested which 
isolate early adopters, and control for self-selection bias.
The sample includes 13,610 firm-month observations, covering 20 coun­
tries. Contrary to prior literature (e.g. Welker (1995)), results suggest that 
the bid-ask spread actually increased following adoption. The coefficient on 
the slope dummy, which interacts the IHP with the pre-post dummy variable 
however, provides evidence that despite the result on the bid-ask spread, the 
adverse selection component significantly decreased. This is an interesting 
result, which not only provides weight to the Bollen et al. (2004) model, 
but illustrates the bluntness of the bid-ask spread as a variable intent on 
capturing adverse selection, as has been done in the past.
The second essay, which is presented in Chapter 3, addresses whether 
the IFRS are associated with a reduction in the cost of equity. The chapter 
utilises a ex ante cost of equity metric due to Pastor et al. (2008), and a 
measure by Easton (2004) for robustness. Further tests are conducted which 
isolate early adopters, and control for self-selection inherent in the choice to 
voluntarily opt into this regime. In these tests, an abnormal ex ante cost of 
equity measure is substituted as the dependent variable, and is measured as 
the cost of equity according to each of the above measures, less the mean 
cost of equity of a comparison control group of firms.
The sample for Chapter 3 consists of 2,700 firm month observations, and
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covers 17 countries. While some evidence is revealed that the cost of eq­
uity is reduced by IFRS adoption alone, these results are not consistent 
across all specifications. However, the abnormal cost of equity, measured as 
the difference between the cost of equity of the sample firm, less the mean 
of a comparison group, is lower in the post IFRS period for early adopt­
ing firms with greater analyst following than before adoption. Interestingly, 
across both early and official adoptors, this same variable is positive and only 
weakly significant. Hence, it is possible that early adoption has its merits, 
particularly for firms exhibiting greater visibility afforded by higher analyst 
following.
Finally, Chapter 4 examines the association between IFRS adoption and 
stock return volatility, over the short and long-term. A simple model of cross 
sectional stock return volatility is developed, using the intuition behind the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, and the approach taken follows that of the 
preceding two essays.
The sample for Chapter 4 consists of 28,540 firm-month observations for 
10-month pre-post tests, and this sample spans 22 countries. Tests reject 
the null of no decrease in stock volatility following IFRS adoption, but for 
the longer term tests only. Estimation of identical models with a sample of 
3-months pre-post IFRS fail to reject the null. This adds an interesting con­
tribution to the extant literature. Bushee and Noe (2000) for example, iden­
tify that the involvement of aggressive, transient investors contribute to an 
increase in stock volatility following earnings releases, despite theory suggest­
ing a contrary result. Indeed, both are possibly the case. The result within
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Chapter 4 suggesting that stock volatility decreases over the 10-months fol­
lowing IFRS adoption, compared to the 10-months prior. Indeed, failure 
to reject the null in short-term tests, suggests the possibility of aggressive 
trading in the short-run, particularly given the greater transparency widely 
believed to emanate from IFRS adoption.
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